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ABSTRACT 
 
The seaman’s lien is a well-recognised maritime lien. The advancement of the lien may have 
been swayed by public policy and the need to protect the seaman. The premise of the lien is 
that a service was rendered to the ship rather than acknowledging the seaman’s contract of 
employment. Affording seamen the right to approach the courts based on an action in rem, 
affords seamen the opportunity to speedily recover their claims. Of importance to us in this 
thesis will be the discussion around the seaman’s wages lien with a focus on the case that came 
before the Supreme Court of Appeals namely The Asphalt Venture Windrush Intercontinental 
SA and Another v UACC Bergshav Tankers AS (“Windrush”) 2017 (3) SA 1 (SCA).  
In this case the second appellant, the Asphalt Venture, was arrested at the Durban port by the 
respondent for wages that had been ceded and assigned to the respondent by the seamen’s 
families who had not had the seamen’s wages paid out by the previous owners of the Asphalt 
Venture. During the employment contracts between the previous owners and the seamen, the 
Asphalt Venture and her crew were held hostage by Somali pirates which caused great financial 
difficulties for the previous owners. Although the employment contracts terminated whilst the 
crew were held hostage, the previous owners continued to pay the hostages families the wages 
until they could no longer afford to.  The crisp issue facing the court was whether a seaman’s 
lien existed in terms of the employment contracts between the seamen and the Asphalt Venture. 
Secondly whether a maritime lien can be ceded or assigned to another person. Further, whether 
the attack by the Somali pirates constituted a supervening impossibility with regards to the 
employment contracts.  
This research paper will focus provide on maritime liens, providing the historical background 
on liens and the seaman’s lien internationally in South Africa. Thereafter our focus will be the 
decision of the court a quo and the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Windrush decision. Finally, 
a discussion on piracy and the applicability of the doctrine of impossibility in contracts of 
employment for seamen, and the findings and recommendations of the writer. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
DB Toy submits that any discussions of the maritime lien will ultimately begin in the wrong 
place.1 The definition of a maritime lien in the writer’s view will not be an entirely wrong 
partition to commence a discussion on a maritime lien. Also described as an admiralty lien,2 
maritime liens are unique instruments that exist to guard persons and their property that have 
interacted with a ship and have suffered damage or incurred expenses thereby.3 A maritime 
lien thus acts as security for the claimant in possession of the debtor’s property for the claim 
that is due. However, the maritime liens were not created for the sole purpose of only providing 
security to the materialman or other creditors.  
1.1 Definition of a maritime lien 
A widely accepted definition of the maritime lien was provided by Lord Tenerden who defined 
it as “a claim or privilege upon a maritime res to be carried into effect by legal process”.4 Judge 
Curtis provided in The Young Mechanic5 that the maritime lien is a  
real and vested interest in the thing, constituting an incumberance placed thereon by operation 
of law, to be executed by judicial process against the thing to which no party is made a party 
save by his voluntary intervention and claim.6 
Arthur L. Shipman further states that it does not exist as an agreement between the parties but 
as an operation of law and therefore the law must step in to enforce the lien.7  
In 1852, the case of Harmer v Bell – The Bold Buccleugh (“The Bold Buccleugh”)8 provided 
the maritime industry with what has become the popular definition of a maritime lien. In this 
case a Scotch steamer collided with an English vessel in the Humber. An action was instituted 
                                                          
1 DB Toy, “Introduction to the Law of Maritime Liens” (1973) 47 Tulane Law Review 559.  
2 AP Trichardt Maritime Liens and the Conflict of Laws (2011) 7. 
3 Trichardt (see note 2; 8).  
4 Toy (see note 1; 559). 
5 The Young Mechanic 2 Curtis 404. 
6 Ibid at 413. 
7 Arthur L. Shipman “The Maritime Lien” (1892) 2 Yale Law Journal 9 at 10. 
8 Harmer v Bell – The Bold Buccleugh (1852) 7 Moo PC 267. 
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in the Court of Admiralty in England by the owners of the English vessel against the owners 
of the steamer and a warrant of arrest was issued however before she could be arrested, the 
steamer sailed for Scotland. A suit was then commenced by the owners of the English vessel 
against the owner of the steamer in the court of session in Scotland for the damage and the 
steamer was arrested in terms of that court’s process and was then released on bail. Pending 
the proceedings, the steamer was sold without notice to the purchaser of this unsatisfied claim 
against her. The proceedings in the Court of Session in Scotland were still pending when the 
steamer sailed for England and was subsequently arrested there. An action for damages 
commenced in the English Court for the same cause of action still pending in Scotland. 
Instructions were sent to abandon proceedings in Scotland. The new owner of the steamer 
defended the action stating that firstly lis alibi pendens9 and secondly, he was unaware that 
such lien existed against the steamer and was a purchaser for the value of the steamer.  
The court held that the lis alibi pendens was incorrect as the proceedings in Scotland were in 
the first instance in personam and against the owners of the vessel whilst the proceedings in 
England were in rem and against the vessel. Secondly the court held that the steamer was liable 
for the damage committed by her, even though she was in the hands of a purchaser without 
notice of the claim. The court provided that a maritime lien is “A claim or privilege upon a 
thing to be carried into effect by legal process”10. Additionally, 
This claim or privilege travels with the thing into whosoever possession it may come. It is 
inchoate from the moment the claim or privilege attaches, and when carried into effect by legal 
process by a proceeding in rem, relates back to the period when it first attached.11 
                                                          
9 Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd v The World of Marble and Granite 2000 CC 2013 (6) SA 499 (SCA) para 2 provides 
“As its name indicates, a plea of lis alibi pendens is based on the proposition that the dispute (lis) between the 
parties is being litigated elsewhere and therefore it is inappropriate for it to be litigated in the court in which the 
plea is raised. The policy underpinning it is that there should be a limit to the extent to which the same issue is 
litigated between the same parties and that it is desirable that there be finality in litigation. The courts are also 
concerned to avoid a situation where different courts pronounce on the same issue with the risk that they may 
reach differing conclusions. It is a plea that has been recognised by our courts for over 100 years.”. 
10 The Bold Buccleugh (see note 8; 285).  
11 Ibid at 285-286. 
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The case of The Halycon Isle12 provides the lien is “devoid of any legal consequences unless 
and until it is carried into effect by legal process”.13 Gorell Barnes J provided in The Ripon 
City14 that  
Such a lien is a privileged claim upon a vessel in respect of service done to it or injury caused 
by it, to be carried into effect by legal process. It is a right acquired by one over a thing 
belonging to another- a jus in re aliena. It is so to speak, a subtraction from the absolute property 
of the owner in the thing.15 
The English statutes and the International Conventions on Maritime Liens and Mortgages of 
1926, 1967 and 1993 have not defined what a maritime lien is and merely provide which 
maritime claims are classified as maritime liens.16 The essential elements of the maritime lien 
are said to be that it is a privileged charge upon a maritime res which comes into existence 
immediately after the facts occur and travels with the res secretly and unconditionally , and 
remaining undeveloped until enforced by an action in rem.17 The charge is described as 
privileged because of the property.18 It is the nature of the lien which decides whether or not a 
lien arises.19  
 
1.2 The origin of the maritime lien 
There seems to be no clear voice on the exact origin of the maritime lien. D.J. Shaw provides 
that the term is derived from English Law and American Law.20 Shaw further provides that it 
is a phrase in line with the Roman-Dutch law and particularly the Civil Law.21 Quite contrarily, 
others have stated that the concept may be originating from Rhodian law, even possibly Greek 
                                                          
12 [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325. 
13 Ibid at 329. 
14 The Ripon City [1987] P 226. 
15 Ibid at 242. 
16 Gys Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction: Law and Practice in South Africa 2nd ed (2012) at 253.  
17 Ibid. 
18The Halcyon Isle (see note 12, 328). 
19 Ibid. 
20 DJ Shaw Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa (1987) 86. 
21 Ibid. 
10 | P a g e  
 
law.22 However, it appears that the widely recognised origin of the maritime lien is Roman 
Law.23 
Roots of the maritime lien are said to be found in Roman law judging from the use of the Latin 
terms used when discussing maritime liens such as ius personam.24 Anton Trichardt provides 
an in-depth look at the development of the Roman maritime law.25 However, the maritime lien 
is said to owe its existence to the Roman law doctrine of hypothecation.26  
The concept of hypothecation begun in contracts for the lease of land where the lessor and 
lessee agreed that the things belonging to the farm would serve as security for payment of the 
rental.27 The hypotheca, as also known, can be defined as an  
…agreement between the debtor and the creditor that certain specific property of the former 
should be liable in full for his debt to the latter; who should be entitled to sell in default of 
payment within a prescribed time.28 
However the personification theory is what perfectly characterises the origin of the concept of 
actions in rem which are actions against the ship directly and recognises the ship as an entity, 
a legal person capable of being sued personally.29 Gys Hofmeyr provided that the 
personification theory is a concept based on the “fiction that a ship is a juridical entity separate 
from her owner and liable for her torts and on her contracts”.30 Although the maritime lien is 
said to derive from Roman Dutch law, Trichardt states that the personification theory was non-
existent in Roman Dutch Law.31  
                                                          
22 AP Trichardt Maritime Liens and the Conflict of Laws (2011) 40 – 44. 
23 As stated by DJ Shaw (see note 20), Trichardt (see note 22) and W. Tetley International Maritime and Admiralty 
Law (2002) 473 – 474. 
24 Trichardt (see note 22; 46 – 47).  
25 Trichardt (see note 22). 
26 Ibid; 63. 
27 Trichardt (see note 22; 64).  
28 Trichardt (see note 22; 69).  
29 Harmer v Bell – Bold Buccleugh (1852) 7 Moo PC 267. 
30 Hofmyer (see note 16; 251). 
31 Trichardt (see note 22; 80). 
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Hofmeyr further states that there are three main theories that have been advanced regarding the 
maritime lien.32 First would be the personification theory which has already been discussed. 
The second would be the procedural theory which positions a maritime lien and the arrest of 
the ship as a procedural tool for receiving security for the claim and compelling the owner to 
enter an appearance to defend.33 The third theory is the historical or conflict theory developed 
by Edward Roscoe where he suggests that because historically it was prohibited to pursue a 
claim against persons but rather the ship or cargo; the industry was forced to accept the arrest 
of ships or cargo as the principal method of gaining jurisdiction justifying the arrest of the 
ship.34  
 
1.3 South African legal position on maritime liens 
Today, the admiralty jurisdiction of South Africa is regulated by the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act 105 of 1983 (hereon referred to as AJRA), which formed an amalgamation of 
the procedures and substantive law that were being exercised in the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty and the ordinary courts.35 AJRA provides for two actions through which a claimant 
can approach the South African courts, namely the action in rem and the action in personam.  
 
The action in rem is a remedy made available to a claimant seeking to claim for a loss incurred 
in relation to a ship.36 The core nature however of the action in rem is that it is instituted against 
the maritime property and the ship is therefore recognised and listed as the defendant.37 An 
action in personam is an action instituted against a person rather than against the vessel or 
maritime property.38 In an action in rem the vessel or maritime property is arrested by the 
claimant on the basis either that the claimant has a maritime lien over the property or the owner 
                                                          
32 Hofmeyr (see note 16; 251). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Both the action in rem and the action in personam are provided for under AJRA. These two actions are to be 
discussed. 
36 Gys Hofmeyr “Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa” (1982) ActaJuridica, 30 at 38. 
37 Christopher Hill, Maritime Law 2ed (1985) 93. 
38 Joseph Herbstein et al. The Civil Practice of the High Courts & Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, at 
102. 
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of the property to be arrested would be liable to the claimant in an action in personam.39 This 
in turn allows South African courts to exercise their jurisdiction over the defendant and where 
the defendant and the plaintiff are peregrine, one of the core elements to establish jurisdiction 
must have arisen within the court’s jurisdiction, namely the cause of action of the contract in 
dispute had been concluded within the courts territorial jurisdiction.40  
 
The law applicable to the South African admiralty matters is catered for under section 6 of 
AJRA which provides  
 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law contained a court 
in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction shall- 
(a) with regard to any matter in respect of which a court of admiralty of the Republic 
referred to in the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, of the United Kingdom, had 
jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of this Act, apply the law which 
the High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom in the exercise of its admiralty 
jurisdiction would have applied with regard to such a matter at such commencement, 
in so far as that law can be applied; 
(b) with regard to any other matter, apply the Roman-Dutch law applicable in the 
Republic. 
 
Therefore, anything which the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 had jurisdiction over 
immediately prior to the promulgation of AJRA would be governed by the law applied by the 
High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction as at 
1 November 1983.  
AJRA does not define a maritime lien, hence one must look at the law as at 1 November 1983 
for what defines a maritime lien. AJRA lists a maritime lien as a maritime claim under section 
1(1)(y).41 Maritime liens are also referred to under section 11 of AJRA which relates to the 
ranking of claims where a fund in a Court is established because of a sale of arrested property 
                                                          
39 Section 3(4) as read with section 3(5)(a) of AJRA. 
40 Herbstein (see note 38). 
41 Section 1(1)(y) of AJRA “any maritime lien, whether or not falling under any of the preceding paragraphs.”. 
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in terms of section 9 or regarding security given in respect of proceeds of property sold pursuant 
to an order or in the execution of a judgment of a Court in terms of the Act.  
In summary, the maritime lien is a type of maritime claim and its importance lies in its 
constituting one of the bases upon which a claimant may institute an action in rem.42. Further, 
it creates a preference in the ranking of claims in terms of section 11 of AJRA.43  
Due to section 6 of AJRA, the law as at 1 November 1983, in the Halcycon Isle which lists the 
English Admiralty as recognising six maritime liens which are bottomry, salvage, collision 
damage, seaman’s wages, master’s wages and master’s disbursements; is what defines the list 
of recognised liens.44 This remains the position as reiterated in the Transol Bunker BV v MV 
Andrico Unity and Others; Grecian-Mar SRL v MV Andrico Unity and others (“Andrico 
Unity”).45 For purposes relevant to this paper, the writer will focus on the enforceability of the 
maritime lien of the seaman’s wages.  
 
1.4 Doctrine of supervening impossibility and seaman’s liens 
A seaman has been described as ignorant and illiterate which has led to the courts being warned 
to be aware of any encroachments on the rights of the seaman to his wages and any other claim 
brought before the court.46 This has led to courts stating that the seaman’s lien is a sacred lien 
which must retain its priority over other claims so long as a plank of the ship still exists.47 
However, it appears one of the threats to the sanctity of the seaman’s lien is the doctrine of 
impossibility. 
The doctrine of impossibility is a concept in the law of contracts used to grant relief to a 
promisor whose contractual performance becomes significantly different from what had 
                                                          
42 Section 3(4)(a) of AJRA. 
43Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity and Others; Grecian-Mar SRL v MV Andrico Unity and others 1989 
(4) SA 325 (A) 331D 
44 Ibid; 331F and 334F. 
45 Andrico Unity (see note 43) 
46 Michael Ng “The Protection of Seafarer’s Wages in Admiralty: A Critical Analysis in the Context of Modern 
Shipping” (2008) 22 Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 133 at 134. 
47 Ibid. 
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reasonably been expected of him due to the occurrence of a supervening event.48 A contractual 
obligation must be possible to perform for it to be valid.49 Where a contract becomes impossible 
to perform, there can be no creation of obligations.50 The defense, which seems to have 
originated from Roman law51, finds itself in most aspects related to the law of contract. 
Application of the defense is not new to maritime contracts. The application however found 
itself being utilised under a different term, namely “frustration of adventure” and “frustration 
of purpose”.52 The frustration of purpose has been defined as an event that may excuse non-
performance of a contract because it defeats or nullifies the objective of the parties under which 
they entered into the contract.53  
The modern development in American law of the doctrine of impossibility of performance is 
referred to as impracticability.54 This refers to situations where performance will be extremely 
expensive, unreasonably time-consuming thus rendering it impracticable for the one who must 
render performance.55 The party alleging impracticability as a defence needs to show that the 
burden of performance would be extreme. 56 
An early case to define the impossibility of performance is the English case Taylor v 
Caldwell57. In this case an owner of a music hall was relieved of his liability to pay damages 
for failing to have a hall available under the terms of the lease when prior to the time of 
performance, the hall was accidentally destroyed in a fire. The court granted relief on the 
principle that in contracts in which the performance depends on the continued existence of a 
given person or thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from 
the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performance.58  
                                                          
48 Charles G. Brown “The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance and the Foreseeability Test” (1975) 6 Loyola 
University Chicago Law Journal 575. 
49 D. Hutchison and CJ Pretorius The Law of Contract (2013). 
50 Wilson v Smith 1956 (1) SA 393 (W) at 396. 
51 William Arthur Ramsden Supervening Impossibility of performance in the SA Law of Contract (1985) 5. 
52 Pamela R. Pepper “The Law of Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code” 3 ed (2014) 244. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Brown (See above note 48). 
55 Pamela R. Pepper The Law of Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code 3 ed (2014) 244. 
56 Ibid. 
57 122 Eng Rep 309 (1863). 
58 Ibid at 314. 
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In terms of the South African law, the test for impossibility of performance was established in 
the case of Wilson v Smith59 as follows: - 
The test is really whether, when the parties entered into the contract the possibility was 
contemplated by them that the event which rendered performance impossible might occur, for 
if the possibility was contemplated and no provision made in the contract against the event the 
implication could be made that the claimant should not be relieved because the event did not 
occur.60 
As early as 1916, English law in the House of Lords provided that the doctrine of impossibility 
of performance in a seaman’s contract was applicable. The case of Horlock v Beal61 was 
regarding a seaman’s wife who approached the courts seeking her husband’s wages for the 
duration of his employment contract. The husband had been detained in a German port because 
of the war. The court held the wife’s claim failed as the capture and holding of the ship by the 
Germans amounted to a frustration of the contract which rendered the performance of the 
contract impossible. Therefore, the contract could no longer be binding on the parties.62 
In South Africa however, the doctrine had not been applied to the seaman’s lien until recently 
in Windrush Intercontinental SA v UACC Bershav Tankers AS 63. The argument advanced by 
the appellant in this case is what ultimately led to the court’s conclusion. The appellant argued 
that the contracts of employment of the hostages had terminated due to piracy being the 
supervening event frustrating the performance of the employment contract. The SCA held that 
there was no maritime lien established based on the doctrine of impossibility of performance.  
  
  
                                                          
59 1956 (1) SA 393 (W). 
60 Ibid at 396C-D. 
61 [1916] UKHL 795. 
62 Ibid at 796 by Earl Loreburn. 
63 2017 (3) SA 1 (SCA). 
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1.5 Pre-Windrush and post Windrush position 
Seaman’s wages are considered a sacred lien and seaman are viewed as favoured litigants.64 
The case of Windrush Intercontinental SA v UACC Bershav Tankers AS (“Windrush”)65 
introduced the principle of impossibility of performance in South African seaman’s lien cases.  
Before this case, the doctrine of impossibility in South Africa had not been discussed in South 
African maritime law other than in the case of New Market, MV; Taxfield Shipping Ltd v Cargo 
Currently Laden on board the MV New Market and Others66 where the applicant sought to rely 
on the doctrine of impossibility to set aside an arrest of cargo which the applicant believed they 
had a lien over. The court however did not deal at all with the doctrine but chose to set aside 
the arrest based on other grounds argued by the applicant.  
The Windrush case came before the Supreme Court of Appeal, South Africa (“SCA”) on appeal 
from the KwaZulu Natal Local Division of the High Court, Durban. This appeal was against 
the court a quo decision to not set aside the deemed arrest of the second appellant, the MT 
Asphalt Venture (“Asphalt Venture”) owned by Bitumen Invest AS (“Bitumen”). The first 
appellant, Windrush Intercontinental SA (“Windrush”) is a company registered in Panama and 
carrying on business in Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. The respondent is UACC 
Bergshav Tankers AS (“Bergshav”), a company duly incorporated and registered in Norway 
and carrying on business as the registered owner of the MT UACC Eagle in Dubai in the United 
Arab Emirates.  
Windrush entered into a bareboat charterparty with Bitumen from 7 May 2008 until 7 
November 2015. The bareboat charterparty was part of a sale and leaseback arrangement 
between Concord Worldwide Inc (“Concord”), Bitumen and Windrush. Concord became the 
owners, sold the Asphalt Venture to Bitumen who then leased it to Windrush. After 7 years, 
Windrush would be obliged to purchase the vessel. The ship was then sub-chartered by 
                                                          
64 Master & Crew of the MT Argun v MT Argun 2003 (3) SA 149 at 155. See also Quick & Louw & Moore (Pty) 
Ltd and Another v SS Almoural and Others 1982 (3) SA 406 (C) where the person who at the request of the owner 
of the vessel paid the crew’s wages and was to be viewed as a necessaries man and could not be recognised as a 
seaman and therefore gain protection of the seaman lien. The court held that the seaman was a favoured litigant 
of the law. See also Kandagasabapathy and Others v MV Melina Tsiris; Hethumuni and Others v MV 
Antigonitsiris 1981 (3) SA 950 (N) at 956B-F. 
65 2017 (3) SA 1 (SCA).  
66 2006 (5) SA 114 (C). 
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Windrush back to Concord for the 7 years. During April 2010 until August 2010, Concord 
through its crew agent and technical manager; OMCI ship management (Pvt) Ltd (“OMCI”) 
entered into employment contracts with 15 crew members, citizens of the Republic of India to 
crew the Asphalt Venture.67 
On September 2010, Somali pirates hijacked and held for ransom, the Asphalt Venture about 
100 nautical miles east of Mombasa, Kenya. Concord then informed their insurers of the 
hijacking and acquired assistance to begin negotiations with the pirates and appointed a 
negotiator. Seven months later, USD 3.4 million was delivered to secure the release of the 
vessel and her crew members. However, after the ransom was paid, only eight crew members 
were released, seven were further held captive to be used in negotiations for the release of 120 
Somali pirates arrested by the Indian government. The Indian government though refused to 
negotiate with the pirates. It was only during August and December 2014 after payment of a 
further ransom that the pirates finally released the remaining crew members.68 
During this troublesome period, Windrush withdrew the Asphalt Venture from the sub-bareboat 
charterparty with Concord, thereby terminating the sub-bareboat charterparty. The termination 
was due to Concord not being able to meet their financial obligations in terms of the 
charterparty as the vessel was held for ransom. Concord, despite the piracy, continued to pay 
the hostages’ families amounts which were equivalent to the hostages’ wages until the end of 
October 2011, six months after the first eight had been released.  
Before any of the crew members were released, Concord had continued to make payment to 
the crew in terms of the crew’s employment contracts. After the first eight were released, 
Concord paid for their repatriation costs and were accordingly released from the vessel. This 
was paid on a voluntary basis, in sympathy. The payments by Concord to the families ceased 
when Concord began experiencing financial difficulties.  
Due to Concord’s financial difficulties, the Indian government and Norwegian Maritime 
Officers’ Association demanded that Bitumen as the vessels owner; continue paying the 
hostages (the remaining seven). In response to this, Windrush argued that neither it or Bitumen 
                                                          
67 Windrush (see note 65; para 2). 
68 Windrush (see note 65; para 3). 
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were liable for the crew wages as the contracts of employment were entered between the crew 
and Concord as sub-bareboat charterer.69 
On 17 January 2012, the UACC Eagle was arrested in Mumbai India by the hostages’ families 
representing the hostages as security for their cumulative claim of USD 6 787 440 they sought 
payment for the wages they would have received from November 2011 until they turned 70 
years of age. It was alleged that the UACC Eagle was arrested because it was in the same 
beneficial ownership, basically a sister ship in terms of Indian Law as the Asphalt Venture. 
Bergshav successfully contested this allegation. Despite this, Bergshav entered into a 
settlement agreement with the hostages’ families which was approved by the Bombay High 
Court on 10 February 2012. This was to obtain the speedy release of the UACC Eagle and 
avoid further litigation. The terms of the settlement were that the hostages held a maritime lien 
for unpaid crew wages recognised in Indian Law. Bergshav undertook to pay into an escrow 
account the claims of the crew wages, the future wages until the end of December 2012, and 
crew’s wages for 2013; subject to its right to call for arbitration on whether the hostages’ 
employment contracts entitled them to crew wages pending repatriation. Due to this 
undertaking, the hostages’ families ceded unconditionally and irrevocably assigned “any claim 
and/or maritime lien they have or may have in the same priority against the Asphalt 
Venture…”.70  
Based on this cession, Bergshav commenced an action in rem against the Asphalt Venture in 
KwaZulu Natal. The Asphalt Venture was released by the provision of security by Windrush’s 
Protection and Indemnity Club without an admission of liability and without prejudice to the 
rights and contentions of the owners of the bareboat charterers of the Asphalt Venture.71  
Bergshav alleged that the hostages were employees of the Bitumen, alternatively of Concord 
as the sub-bareboat charterer. They further alleged that they remained in the employment and 
therefore were entitled to be paid wages reflected in their contracts of employment during the 
necessary periods and following any valid termination thereof. The main argument was that 
the unpaid wages were maritime claims as defined in AJRA.72 
                                                          
69 Windrush (see note 65; para 6). 
70 Windrush (see note 65; para 7 – 8). 
71 Windrush (see note 65; para 9). 
72 Windrush (see note 65; para 10-11). 
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The issue before the SCA was whether a maritime lien existed against the Asphalt Venture at 
the time of its arrest for the crew’s wages entitling Bergshav to arrest the Asphalt Venture by 
way of an action in rem in terms of section 3(4)(a) of AJRA.  
The court looked at the case of The Ever Success73 which provided that for the lien to exist, 
there must be a service rendered to the ship. In this case the plaintiff claimed wages in respect 
of an employment contract. One of the issues was the exact period of employment. The court 
held that the service rendered by the seaman was usually measured by reference to the seaman’s 
contract of service, looking at the period the service was rendered.74  
The argument advanced by the appellant is what ultimately led to the court’s conclusion. The 
appellant argued that the contracts of employment of the hostages had terminated by no later 
than 15 April 2011 due to a supervening event frustrating the performance of the contract. The 
SCA held that there was no maritime lien established due to the impossibility of performance.75  
1.6 Conclusion 
The writer is of the view that the Windrush decision firmly establishes the application of the 
doctrine of impossibility in the context of maritime liens, specifically seaman’s lien. It does 
not treat the seaman’s lien as sacred. The decision also begins the conversation in South Africa 
around piracy as a supervening event rendering performance in a contract, impossible. 
The question which also becomes a point of contention is whether piracy along the East African 
coast (specifically in the region which the vessel was attacked) is an unexpected event, as per 
the test in Wilson v Smith.76 There are articles written surrounding the frequency of piracy along 
the East African coast during the years of 2009-2010.77 In 2008 alone, 111 pirate attacks were 
reported off the Somali coastline.78 Reports inform us that these were very common, so much 
so that Kenya engaged with the United States of America and the United Kingdom and signed 
                                                          
73 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 824. 
74 Ibid at 831. 
75 Windrush (see note 65; para 42). 
76 1956 (1) SA 393 (W). 
77 McDonald,M “Record Number of Somali Pirate Attacks in 2009” (2009) The New York Times available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/world/africa/30piracy.html accessed 18.06.2018; “Pirates hijack cargo ship 
near Seychelles” (2009) available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/10/22/seychelles.pirate.hijack/index.html accessed 18.06.2018. 
78 Hinton, S “Somali Piracy: Applying Universal Jurisdiction” (2012) 3 Malabu: Maritime Law Bulletin 13 at 15.  
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a Memorandum of Understanding in 2009 to prosecute pirates captured by their navies.79 
Would then a pirate attack be an unexpected event in the region which the Asphalt Venture was 
attacked? 
The next paragraph will discuss the research questions to be answered by this research, together 
with the research methodology that will be used by the writer. Thereafter chapter two will 
commence with a discussion on the development of a maritime lien. 
1.7 Research Questions to be answered  
The questions to be answered in this paper are: 
1.7.1 What is the definition of maritime liens and the different types of maritime liens in 
South Africa and internationally.  
1.7.2 What is a seaman’s wages lien and to what extent is it protected in SA law and 
international law. 
1.7.3 What were the decisions of the Court a quo and the SCA findings of the Windrush 
case?  
1.7.4 What is the doctrine of supervening impossibility? 
1.7.5 What is the effect of the doctrine of supervening impossibility on a seaman’s wages 
lien? 
1.7.6 Can piracy be considered an unexpected circumstance along the East African coast 
to constitute a supervening impossibility? 
 
1.8 Methodology to be used 
This dissertation will consist of a desktop review of the legal materials. The rules and 
arguments set out in these materials will be analysed and discussed in a coherent, concise and 
critical manner. 
 
  
                                                          
79 Chang, D “Piracy laws and the Effective Prosecution of Pirates” (2010) 33 Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review 273. 
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1.9 How each chapter will contribute towards answering the research questions 
 
1.9.1 The first chapter will be an introduction to the concept of maritime liens and will 
define the maritime lien and different types of maritime liens with particular 
reference to a seaman’s wages lien. 
 
1.9.2 The second chapter will address the development of maritime liens and the action 
in rem both in South Africa and internationally.  
 
1.9.3 The third chapter will discuss the development of the seaman’s lien in South African 
law and internationally. 
 
1.9.4 The fourth chapter will discuss the Windrush decision namely the Court a quo as 
well as the SCA decision.  
 
1.9.5  Chapter five will discuss the doctrine of impossibility of performance and the issue 
of piracy along the African coast considering the Windrush decision.  
 
1.9.6 Chapter Six will be a conclusion summarizing the effect of the Windrush decision 
in light of a maritime lien and supervening impossibility. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2. The development of the maritime lien and action in rem 
The maritime lien is a prominent feature of the maritime law claims instituted in the admiralty 
courts, not only internationally but in South Africa as well. As discussed, a maritime lien is a 
maritime claim which travels with the vessel into whosoever’s possession it may happen to be 
in from the time it arises.80 The lien, which attached itself to the vessel the first time it arose, 
is carried into effect by the procedure of an action in rem.81 
2.1 The origin of the maritime lien 
With the action in rem being the procedure by which the maritime lien is enforced, it is 
important to consider the origin of the maritime lien which has not been fully and firmly 
established. Paul Macarius Herbert provides:  
 
The origin of the maritime lien is shrouded in obscurity. The probable explanation for this is 
the struggle in England between the admiralty and the courts of common law, with the latter 
emerging victorious in the last half of the seventeenth century. As a result, we have little 
accurate information on the history of maritime liens in English law.82 
 
There are three main theories that have been advanced regarding the origin of the maritime lien 
namely, the personification theory, the procedural theory and the historical (conflict) theory 
(also referred to as the Roscoe theory).83 The writer is of the view that the conflict theory and 
the procedural theory are similar as their focus lies in the main purpose of the procedural 
aspects of the maritime lien. However, the personification theory looks to focus on the res 
itself. 
  
                                                          
80Harmer v Bell – The Bold Buccleugh (1852) 7 Moo PC 267 at 285-286. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Paul Macarius Hebert “Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens” (1929-1930) 4 Tulane Law Review 381; 382. 
83 Gys Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction, Law and Practice in South Africa 2ed (2012) 251. 
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a. The historical theory 
The historical theory is also referred to as the Roscoe Theory.84 It provides that the arrest of 
the res was a procedural device to obtain personal jurisdiction and was developed to assume 
jurisdiction in personam, which was prohibited by the common law courts.85 As a result of the 
conflict between the common law courts and the courts of admiralty, maritime liens and the 
action in rem were developed.86 Alongside the common law countries and admiralty courts 
during Medieval England existed the merchant courts.87 According to Roscoe, the courts of 
admiralty were governed by the civil law and the laws of Oléron and the codified customs of 
the Admiralty.88  
Issues surrounding jurisdiction ensued between the courts for years.89 However, in the late 16th 
Century, the admiralty courts struggled for existence as the common law courts were 
dominating.90 The taking of bail instead of keeping the property under arrest became a vital 
part of admiralty law.91 The admiralty courts accepted bail and released the property. The 
amount received as bail became the subject of the action in rem.92  
Admiralty law became more interesting when the lawyers begun claiming that the money 
provided to secure the release of the arrested ship was not “bail” but rather a stipulation.93 The 
stipulation is a form of an express hypothecation with the stipulation being a solemn promise 
to repay the money loaned on the terms agreed.94 The stipulation found in Roman law was 
                                                          
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 William Tetley Maritime Liens and Claims (1985) 36. 
87 These courts include Pie Powder courts of Rochester and Ipswich. Ibid, 19-20. 
88 Edward Stanley Roscoe The Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice of the High Court of Justice (1931) 28. 
89 Neill Hutton “The Origin, Development, and Future of Maritime Liens and the Action in Rem” (2003) 28 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal 81 at 102-103. 
90 Ibid, 104. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Tetley (see note 86; 227). 
94 Edward F Ryan “Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Maritime Lien: A Historical Perspective” (1968) 7 Western 
Ontario Law Review 173 at 184. 
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derived from Greek law where it must be written.95 However, in Roman law it needs not be 
written.96 
The maritime lien is not identical to the hypothec. For example, creditors who held hypothecs 
are paid in the order of their accrual, with the latest being the last to be paid.97 On the contrary, 
maritime liens often rank in reverse order of accrual with the most recent having the highest 
priority.98 
The admiralty courts triumphed over the common law courts because they emphasised form 
over substance and in doing so developed the foundation of modern admiralty law – proceeding 
on a maritime lien by way of an action in rem.99 Proceeding in rem was a result of the conflict 
that existed between the admiralty courts and the common law courts.100 The main aim of the 
in rem procedure was to found jurisdiction.101 This was supported by the Court of Appeal in 
The Beldis, 102 stating that the arrest of the res was a mere procedure, and that its only object 
was to obtain security that the judgment should be satisfied.103 It may be that this was not the 
only, or indeed the primary, object, and that the original object of arrest was to found 
jurisdiction at a time when any attempt to assume jurisdiction in personam was prohibited by 
the common law courts. 
 This was supported in The Tervaete where Lord Justice Scrutton provided that the action in 
rem is not based upon the wrongdoing of the ship personified as an offender, but is a means of 
bringing the owner of the ship to meet his personal liability by seizing his property.104 
The historical theory finds support in the case of Justin v Ballam105 where it was provided that 
“in maritime law every contract of the master implies a hypothecation”. This theory was 
                                                          
95 Hutton (see note 89; 105). 
96 Ibid. 
97 Paul Macarius Hebert “Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens” (1929-1930) 4 Tulane Law Review 381,405. 
98 Hebert (see note 18; 405-406). Seaman’s wages are an exception to this rule. 
99 Ryan (see note 94; 185). 
100 Roscoe (see note 88; 27-28). 
101 Hutton (see note 89; 106-107). 
102 The Beldis [1936] P. 51, 73-74. 
103 Ibid; 73 – 74. 
104 The Tervaete [1922] Eng CA P 259, 270 (Scrutton, LJ). 
105 Justin v Ballam 2 Lord Raymond’s King’s Bench and Common Pleas Reports 805 (1711). 
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strengthened by the established practice that a seaman’s lien would be extinguished if the ship 
was destroyed.106  
 
b. The procedural theory 
The procedural theory provides that the maritime lien and the consequent arrest of the ship 
constitute a procedural device, not only to obtain security for payment of the claim but to 
compel the owner to enter an appearance to defend.107  
Herbert provides that this theory substantiates that the right to proceed in rem is a matter of 
procedure having no connection with the substantive rights conferred by the maritime lien.108 
The theory provides the following consequences: 
aa) There may be a right to proceed in rem regardless of the existence of a maritime 
lien; 
bb) The proceeding in rem based on a maritime lien is in substance an action against 
the owner of the vessel and the vessel is not liable unless the owners are 
personally liable; and 
cc) The recovery in an action in rem is not limited to the value of the res where the 
defendant has appeared to defend the suit in rem.109  
According to the procedural theory, the origin of the maritime lien is born out of the arrest of 
a vessel to compel the appearance of its owner and it developed a way to source funds from 
which potential judgments could be awarded.110 The theory has been attributed to Reginald 
Marsden.111 The theory was supported by the case of Greenway & Barker where it was held 
that “execution ought to be only for goods, for the ship is only arrested; and the libel ought to 
be only against the ship and goods, not against the party”.112 
                                                          
106 EC Mayers Admiralty Law and Practice in Canada (1916); 7. 
107 Gys Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction, Law and Practice in South Africa 2ed (2012); 251. 
108 Hebert (see note 18; 385). 
109 Ibid. 
110 Neill Hutton “The Origin, Development, and Future of Maritime Liens and the Action in Rem” (2003) 28 
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111 Ibid, 98. 
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However, the theory has been heavily criticised as it was recognised as stripping “away the 
form and revealed that in substance the owners were parties to the action in rem”.113  
c. The personality theory 
The personality theory, however, seems to be the theory which has been adopted internationally 
in the maritime community and is said to be the reason actions in rem have continued to exist.114 
Oliver Holmes provides: 
the ship is the only security available in dealing with foreigners, and rather than send one’s own 
citizens to search for a remedy abroad in strange courts, it is easy to seize the vessel and satisfy 
the claim at home, leaving the foreign owners to get their indemnity as they may be able. I dare 
say some such thought has helped to keep the practice alive, but I believe the true historic 
foundation is elsewhere.115  
Holmes traced the origin of the above theory as the basic desire for vengeance on the offending 
thing and not compensation.116  The use of the action in rem initially did serve the purpose of 
security for compensation, but these remedies soon appealed to public interest, specifically 
where a foreign ship was the ship in question.117 The ship acquired its own personality and 
became competent to enter into contracts and was individually liable.118 
During the late 19th century, English courts ascribed to the personality theory to justify the 
action in rem and maritime liens but this was not particularly popular.119 On the other hand the 
American courts practised the personality theory and adhered to it, despite its shortcomings.  
In the case of The Little Charles,120 a vessel was charged with violating the embargo laws, in 
departing from a port of the United States and proceeding to Antigua. In this case the Chief 
Justice Marshall stated that it was not a proceeding against the owner but a proceeding against 
the vessel, for an offense committed by the vessel. This is not less an offence or an offence that 
                                                          
113 Republic of India v Indian SS Co [1997] 4 All ER 380 at 387. 
114 Oliver Wendell Holmes, JR The Common Law 3ed (1923) 28. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Holmes (see note 114; 2) 
117 Hutton (see note 110; 93). 
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119 Hutton (see note 110; 94). 
120 United States v The Little Charles 26 Fed Cas 979.. 
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would leave her exposed to forfeiture because it was committed without authority and against 
the will of the owner.121  
The personality theory has been perfectly described by Justice Brown who stated:  
“A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is preserved. Prior to her 
launching she is a mere congeries of wood and iron – an ordinary price of personal property – 
as distinctly a land structure as a house, and subject only to mechanics’ [possessory] liens … 
in the baptism of launching she receives her name, and from the moment her keel touches the 
water she is transformed, and becomes a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. She acquires a 
personality of her own; becomes competent to contract, and is individually liable for her 
obligations, upon which she may sue in the name of her owner, and be sued in her own name.”122 
Yet to simply look at the res and think rights and liabilities of persons is not affected would be 
incorrect.123 The action in rem procedure which can lead to the sale of a ship will have a direct 
impact on the owner of the ship.124 The writer submits that strict adherence to the personality 
theory is also in itself problematic as ultimately the res is owned by another who is financially 
affected by anything which occurs to the res. 
2.2 The action in rem and the action in personam 
The action in rem is a remedy made available to a claimant125 seeking to claim for a loss 
incurred in relation to a ship.126 The core nature, however, of the action in rem is that it is 
instituted against the maritime property and the ship is thus recognised and listed as the 
defendant.127 The property is arrested and held until judgment has been satisfied.128 Where 
there is judgment in favour of the plaintiff, the property is sold and the proceeds of the sale are 
distributed by the court, subject to any preferential rights that may exist.129 In practice the 
Protection and Indemnity Club also, instead of waiting for judgment in the matter, offers 
                                                          
121 Ibid at 979. 
122 Tucker v Alexandroff 183 US 424, 438 (1912). 
123 Hutton (see note 110; 96). 
124 Ibid. 
125 A person who holds a maritime claim as described under section 1 “maritime claim” (a) – (ff) of the Act. 
126 Gys Hofmeyr “Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa” (1982) ActaJuridica 30 at 38. 
127 Christopher Hill Maritime Law 2ed (1985) 93.  
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security for the claim in order to have the vessel or property released. The amount of security 
provided cannot exceed the value of the ship.130 
The alternative action to the action in rem is the action in personam. Section 3(2) of the Act 
reads   
(2) An action in personam may only be instituted against a person - 
(a) resident or carrying on business at any place in the Republic; 
(b) whose property within the court’s area of jurisdiction has been attached by the 
plaintiff or the applicant, to found or to confirm jurisdiction; 
(c) who has consented or submitted to the jurisdiction of the court; 
(d) in respect of whom any court in the Republic has jurisdiction in terms of Chapter 
IV of the Insurance Act, 1943 (Act No. 27 of 1943); 
(e) in the case of a company, if the company has a registered office in the Republic. 
This provision allows South African courts to exercise their jurisdiction over the defendant and 
where the defendant and the plaintiff are peregrines.131 In order to establish jurisdiction, facts 
such as the cause of action of the contract in dispute must have occurred within the court’s 
territorial jurisdiction.132  
The action in rem can be instituted by a claimant who has a maritime lien over the property to 
be arrested or if the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable to the claimant in an 
action in personam on the cause of action instituted upon.133 Whilst with an action in personam, 
it can be instituted where there is any maritime claim.134 However, an action in rem can only 
be instituted in six instances, namely: on a claim which lies in respect of (one or more of the 
following) a ship with or without its equipment; furniture, equipment, stores, bunkers or a part 
thereof; cargo or a part of it; freight; a container; and a fund.135 
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a. The nature of the action in rem internationally 
The nature of the action in rem is quite debatable and stands as a continuous litigation point 
due to the idea that it is purely procedural whilst other jurisdictions say that it is a result of the 
application of the personification theory which provides that the object is held to be liable for 
any human injury suffered due to the use of that object.136 This allows claimants to directly 
institute proceedings against a vessel, giving it human character as though it can incur liability 
without theoretically involving the owner of the ship in person.137  The United States 
(American) law and English law have discussed the nature of the action in rem and have 
provided the maritime industry with jurisprudence through their case law.  
The American courts supported the personification theory.138 Evidence of this was the decision 
reached in The China139 where a harbour pilot who had to be present on the vessel caused a 
collision in the New York Harbour on board the vessel. The Supreme Court held that the failure 
to hold the vessel liable for a fault of the compulsory pilot would be unfair and undermine the 
importance of the maritime code on the personification of the vessel.140 The American 
admiralty courts are committed to the personification theory.141 Many decades later, Bradley 
Schwab142 provided that according to the Supplemental Admiralty Rules, Rule C(1)(b) states 
that except as otherwise provided by law, a party who may proceed in rem may also, or in the 
alternative,  proceed in personam against any person who may be liable.143 However, it has not 
been expressly confirmed that the in rem and in personam proceedings can be instituted 
simultaneously over the same claim.144 
                                                          
136 Bradley J Schwab “Equitable Personification: A review of Res Judicata’s Historical Application to Successive 
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On the other hand, English law stated that in rem liability was dependent on the in personam 
liability of the owner. English law provides that the action in rem is simply procedural and is 
to simply secure the appearance of the defendant owner.145 It was held in the English case 
Republic of India and Another v Indian Steamship Co Ltd (The Indian Grace) (No 2)146 that 
the action in rem is an action against the owner from the moment the admiralty court is seized 
with the jurisdiction.147 In the English case The Dictator148, the court provided that once an 
owner enters an appearance to defend and the owner is personally liable on the claim, the action 
then proceeds as an action in rem and an action in personam.149 Therefore, the owners assets 
are also subject to execution in the satisfaction of the judgment as he has submitted himself to 
the court’s jurisdiction. 150 
b. The nature of an action in rem in SA 
A South African case to look at is SA Boatyards CC v The Lady Rose (Formerly known as the 
Shiza)151 where it was held that although the action in rem is a procedure against the maritime 
property, for purposes of a claim in reconvention, the owner of arrested property is to be 
recognised as being a defendant in Admiralty Rule 8 of the Admiralty Proceedings Rules.152 It 
has therefore been recognised that an owner is not entirely a stranger to the action in rem 
proceedings as seen in discussions under chapter 2.1 of this chapter.153  
Another South African case that arises when discussing the nature of the action in rem is the 
case MV Alina (No 2) Transnet Ltd v Owner of MV Alina.154 The matter dealt with the issue of 
whether a plaintiff can commence an action in rem by way of arresting a vessel based on the 
                                                          
145 DC Jackson “Current English Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice” 5 (1982) Acta Juridica at 14. 
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owner’s personal liability for the claim sought, receive a notice of intention to defend the 
action, but still seek attachment of the vessel for purposes of confirming and founding 
jurisdiction based on the same claim but in different proceedings.155 In this case, Transnet the 
port authority at Saldanha Bay had the Alina II, a bulk carrier berthed at one of the two berths 
at the terminal where it commenced loading cargo. Two days after loading commenced, a hull 
fracture was discovered, and the vessel then remained at the berth for approximately three 
months because her cargo had to be transhipped. Arising from these averments, Transnet 
claimed it had suffered damages and instituted two actions in rem to recover the damages 
claimed.  The owner then entered a notice of intention to defend and Transnet delivered its 
particulars. The actions were based on section 3(4)(b) of AJRA.  
 
Wallis JA (as he was then known) however provided that it has been generally accepted that a 
claimant who has not received satisfaction after proceeding in rem is entitled to pursue a claim 
against the owner in personam provided the owner is personally liable on the claim.156 The 
main issue, however, was whether the owner of the Alina II had submitted itself to the 
jurisdiction of the South African court in respect of these claims.157 It was held that the 
attachment cannot be maintained as the defendant under the action in rem, had entered an 
appearance to defend, which would be sufficient to say that the owner had submitted personally 
to the court’s jurisdiction.158  
 
An advantage of the action in personam is clearly the security one may receive on the release 
of the maritime property from attachment as the plaintiff’s claim may be above the value of the 
vessel. However, a disadvantage would be where the defendant is not domiciled within the 
court’s territorial jurisdiction as the action in personam is dependent on the serving of summons 
properly and effectively on the defendant.159 This disadvantage is what makes most litigants in 
the maritime industry seek to institute an action in rem rather than an action in personam 
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156 MV Alina (see note 154; para 9). 
157MV Alina (see note 154; para13).  
158MV Alina (see note 154; para 36).  
159 Christopher Hill Maritime Law 2ed (1985) 94. 
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because the claimant simply waits for the ship to arrive within the courts territorial jurisdiction 
and serves papers. 160 
 
2.3 Conclusion  
The House of Lords provided that the idea that a ship can be a defendant in a matter is simply 
fiction.161 The theory that is found mostly in modern admiralty law is the personification 
theory, namely that the lien is travelling with the ship into whosoever’s possession. However, 
it will ultimately affect the owner, or a new owner, depending on when the person who has the 
lien against the vessel decides to enforce it. The maritime lien is a complicated tool utilised to 
protect claimants with a recognised lien in the maritime industry. It is enforced through the 
action in rem and generally thought of as inextinguishable.  
For purposes of this paper, the writer will draw attention in the next chapter to what happens if 
the claimant is a seaman. In this case, the seaman must firstly establish whether there is a 
seaman’s lien. For it to exist, we should also question how the lien has developed over the years 
and the law applicable to it in modern admiralty law. At the heart of it, the seaman is a protected 
litigant because of the lien he may possibly hold.  The next chapter will define the seaman’s 
lien and it development in South Africa and internationally. 
                                                          
160 Hill (see note 159; 96). 
161 Republic of India v Indian SS Co (The Indian Endurance) [1998] AC 878 HLat 10. 
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Chapter 3 
3.  Development and defining the seaman’s lien 
 A seaman’s lien has been held to constitute whatever can be fairly said to have been earned 
by a seaman for services he or she has rendered or any payment he or she receives for executing 
his or her duties.162 Also, this extends to benefits which may have accrued to the seaman by 
reason of his or her employment.163 However, not all wages give rise to a maritime lien.164 
The general rule is, in order to give rise to a seaman’s lien, the payment due must be for 
services rendered to the ship.165 In The Halcyon Skies166, Brandon J states that what constituted 
wages in terms of Admiralty for the purposes of a seaman’s lien was extended long ago.167 In 
The Halcyon Skies168, Brandon J held that a seaman’s claim in respect of the contribution to 
which the seaman’s employer was obliged to pay to a pension fund for the seaman, was a 
claim for wages within the meaning of s1(1)(o) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956.169 
Brandon J also refers to The Arosa Star170 where in an Admiralty action in rem it was held that 
a seaman could recover the employers contributions for social insurance as being emoluments 
in the nature of wages to which he was entitled under his of employment.171  
Section 1(1)(s) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act (“AJRA”)172, provides 
the employment of any master, officer or seaman of a ship in connection with or in relation to 
a ship, including the remuneration of any such person, and contributions in respect of any such 
person to any pension fund, provident fund, medical aid fund, benefit fund, similar fund, 
association or institution in relation to or for the benefit of any master, officer or seaman; 
                                                          
162 Gys Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction, Law and Practice in South Africa 2ed (2012)263-264. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Hofmeyr (see note 162; 264). 
165 Ibid. When considering what defines “the ship”, this includes her tackle, apparel and furniture and any part 
thereof and the freight are burdened with the lien. As the lien is based upon service rendered to the ship, cargo is 
not subject to the lien. (Hofmeyr see note 162; 266). 
166 [1976] 1 LLR 461. 
167 Ibid. 
168 See note 166 above. 
169 Ibid, 466 – 467. 
170 [1959] 2 LLR 396. 
171 The Halcyon Skies (see note 166, 464 – 465). 
172 105 of 1983. 
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The Windrush Intercontinental SA and Another v UACC Bergshav AS Asphalt Venture 
(Windrush)173 decision centralises around the seaman’s lien and whether in the circumstances, 
the lien existed. The employment contracts were used as a means of proving that the crew were 
indeed employed on the ship, however the real question was whether they held a lien in respect 
of their claims. Discussing the development and definitions given to the lien provide a stable 
foundation for understanding the Windrush case and the decision reached by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. 
 
3.1 Development of the seaman’s lien internationally 
Hofmeyr provides that the development of the seaman’s lien is thought to be based on 
considerations of public policy with special sympathy given to seamen which needed to be 
extended by the court to all seamen.174 Lord Stowell provided that the need to protect the 
seaman was based on their lack of formal education, providing that they were  
a set of men, generally ignorant and illiterate, notoriously and proverbially reckless and 
improvident, ill provided with the means of obtaining useful information, and almost ready to 
sign any instrument that may be proposed to them; and on all accounts requiring protection, 
even against themselves.175  
However, the writer is of the opinion that this description does not give the picture of the 
seaman’s place in society, namely that of a highly respected litigant. More so when the seaman 
enters the courtroom and it has been stated that their “questions of wages should be speedily 
settled”.176 Lord Stowell stated time and time again that the seaman has a sacred lien. He went 
on to provide, quite dramatically: “A seaman’s claim for his wages was sacred so long as a 
single plank of the ship remained”. 177 
                                                          
173 2017 (3) SA 1 (SCA). 
174 Hofmeyr (see note 162, 262-263). 
175 The Minerva (1985) 1 Hagg 347. See also The Prince George (1837) 3 Hag Adm 376; 382 where a mortgagee 
wanted to contest litigation by a seaman for his wages against the ship. The Admiralty court rejected the claim as 
impractical and the seaman need not be exposed to this drawn out litigation. 
176 The Caracas Bay: Ex Parte the Crew of the MV Caracas Bay 1977 (4) SA 945 (C); 951H. 
177 The Sydney Cove (1815) 1 Dods 11 This, however, is difficult to implement when the doctrine of impossibility 
is at play. The doctrine will be examined at a later stage under chapter 4. 
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Initially freight was known as the “mother all wages”.178 This meant that wages could not be 
earned if freight had not been earned on the journey.179 This, however, became difficult because 
if the ship was destroyed or for some reason there was no freight earned the seaman would not 
be paid any wages although this was not caused by them.180 The condition was thrown out 
when the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 (United Kingdom) (MSAUK) under section 183 
provided that:  
“No Right to Wages shall be dependent on the earning of Freight; and every Seaman and 
Apprentice who would be entitled to demand and recover any Wages if the Ship in which he 
has served had earned Freight, shall, subject to all other Rules of Law and Conditions applicable 
to the case, be entitled to claim and recover the same, notwithstanding that Freight has not been 
earned; but in all cases of Wreck or Loss of the Ship, Proof that he has not exerted himself to 
the utmost to save the Ship, Cargo, and Stores, shall bar his claim.”181 
Once this legislation was enacted, seamen could claim wages even where the ship had not 
earned any freight.182  
Another issue that plagued the seaman was whether the wages being claimed were wages 
earned “on board the ship” as envisioned under section 10 of the Admiralty Act 1861 (United 
Kingdom).183 This was extremely restrictive as it was left to the courts approaching the 
                                                          
178 The Minerva at 357 & The Juliana (1822) 2 Dods 501; 510. 
179 Hilton Staniland “Should a seaman sue for his wages as a favoured litigant” (1986) 7 Industrial Law Journal 
45; 458. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Section 183 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 (United Kingdom). 
182 Michael Ng “The Protection of seafarers’ wages in admiralty: A critical analysis in the context of modern 
shipping.” (2008) 22 Australian & New Zealand Maritime Law Journal; 138. Liens can still attach to freight 
earned by a vessel however in order to attach same, the claimant must also have a lien over the ship on which the 
freight was earned. Therefore, as Ng puts it, the lien over the freight must stem from a lien over the ship. 
183 Ibid; 140. Section 10 of the Admiralty Act 1861 (UK) provided that : “The High Court of Admiralty shall have 
Jurisdiction over any Claim by a Seaman of any Ship for Wages earned by him on board the Ship, whether the 
same be due under a special contract or otherwise, and also over any Claim by the Master of any Ship for Wages 
earned by him on board the Ship, and for Disbursements made by him on account of the Ship: Provided always 
that if in any cause the Plaintiff does not recover Fifty Pounds, he shall not e entitled to any Costs, Charges or 
Expenses incurred by him therein, unless the Judge shall certify that the cause was a fit one to be tried in the said 
Court.”. 
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seamen’s claims in a relaxed fashion to interpret the meaning thereof.184 The phrase has been 
abandoned in modern maritime statutes.185  
In American law, the seaman has been regarded as a mature individual, capable of entering into 
commercial contracts on his own. Despite this, the American courts have leaned towards 
monitoring the seaman as though he were a child.186 In the case of Harden v Gordon187 a 
seaman claimed for expenses incurred because he had suffered an illness during a journey and 
the shipowner reduced his wages as a result. Justice Story provided that seamen were to be 
treated how young heirs are treated by courts of equity.188 Further, seamen because of their 
lifestyle, are more susceptible to sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils and 
strenuous labour. They are,  
“… generally poor and friendless, and acquire habits of gross indulgence, careless, and 
improvidence. If some provision be not made for the in sickness at the expense of the ship, they 
must often in foreign ports suffer the accumulated evils of disease, and poverty, and sometimes 
perish from the want of suitable nourishment.”189 
The court ruled in favour of the seaman claiming for his medical expenses incurred whilst on 
a ship, including nurses, diet and accommodation if they are carried offshore.190  The courts 
have recognised seamen as needing protection because they are often thoughtless and require 
indulgence because they are gullible and easily taken advantage of.191  
As a result of the character of the seaman, American law developed rules to protect the seaman, 
such as placing the burden of proof on the shipowner to prove that the seaman contracted freely 
and without coercion when entering into the contract.192 Further, payment of the seaman is 
                                                          
184 Ng (see note 182; 139). 
185 Ibid. 
186 Martin J Norris “Seaman As Ward of the Admiralty” (1953-1954) 52 Michigan Law Review 479.  
187 11 Fed. Cas. 480, No. 6047. 
188 Ibid; 485. 
189 Ibid; 483. 
190 Ibid; 484. 
191 Harden (see note 187; 485) 
192 Norris (see note 186; 487). 
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regulated by legislation and is due within 24 hours after the cargo has been discharged or within 
four days of the seaman being discharged, whichever occurs first.193  
Noteworthy internationally is also the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (“MLC, 2006”) 
which came in force on 18 January 2017. 194 The purpose behind the instrument is to create a 
single document encompassing the standards and norms adopted internationally.195 Further, it 
was created to accommodate many different governments, shipowners and seafarers who are 
committed to decent working environments.196  
It is intended to protect a wider group of workers as seafarers and a large number of ships.197 
The definitions of a seafarer and shipowner are wide and thus inclusive.198 Moria L. Mcconnell 
describes it as a delicate balance and is geared towards providing solutions for problems that 
exist between seafarers and shipowners.199 It largely reflects solutions developed by the 
industry.200 MLC, 2006 under Article IV paragraph 2 states that every seafarer has a right to 
fair employment terms but wages and contracts of employment are not discussed. However, 
the Amendments to MLC, 2006 provide provisions granting financial security to seafarers 
when they experience abandonment. Abandonment has been described as having occurring 
when a shipowner,  
                                                          
193 Norris (see note 186; 488). 
194 MLC Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 available at https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-
convention/what-it-does/lang--en/index.htm  accessed 16.07.2018. 
195 Ibid, Preamble. 
196 MLC (see note 194, Preamble). 
197 Moria L. Mcconnell  “A delicate balance: The seafarers’ employment agreement, the system of the Maritime 
Labour Convention, 2006 and the role of flag States. Seafarers: an international labour market in perspective” 
(2016) Editorial Gomylex, 119-174 at 22 available at https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01470314/document 
accessed 11.11.2018. 
198 Article II paragraph 1 (f) “seafarer” means any person who is employed or engaged or works in any ca[acity 
on board a ship to which this Convention applies”. Article II paragraph 1 (j) “shipowner” means the owner of the 
ship or another organization or person, such as the manager, agent or bareboat charterer, who has assumed the 
responsibility for the operation of the ship from the owner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed 
to take over the duties and responsibilities imposed on shipowners in accordance with this Convention, regardless 
of whether any other organization or persons fulfil certain of the duties or responsibilities on behalf of the 
shipowner. 
199 Mcconnell (see note 197, 23). 
200 Ibid. 
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(a) fails to cover the cost of the seafarer’s repatriation; or 
(b) has left the seafarer without the necessary maintenance and support; or 
(c) has otherwise unilaterally severed their ties with the seafarer including 
failure to pay contractual wages for a period of at least two months. 
The Amendments of 2014 to the MLC, 2006 are in force as of 18 July 2016 and are in force in 
South Africa.201  
Considering the existence of the MLC, 2006, it can be deduced that the need to protect the 
seaman is a necessity recognised by the international legal community. The writer is of the 
opinion that the international community’s support for the protection of the seafarer can be 
seen by the number of signatories to the MLC, 2006, which are over 60 countries.202 South 
Africa being one of them, also indicates a strong move by our country to ensure the continued 
protection of the seaman’s rights.   
  
                                                          
201 Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, as amended (MLC, 2006) available at 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:91:0::NO::P91_ILO_CODE:C186 accessed 
11.11.2018. 
202 Ibid. 
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3.2  Seaman’s lien in South Africa 
According to Hofmeyr wages include “whatever could fairly be said to have been earned by 
the seaman’s services or whatever the seaman received in the course of such service as 
compensation for the execution of his or her duties or the benefits which accrued to the seaman 
by reason of his or her employment”.203 
Section 2 of the Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951 (“MSASA”) provides that a seaman is  
any person (except a master, pilot or apprentice-officer) employed or engaged in any capacity 
as a member of the crew of a ship 
The phrase “member of the crew” is similar to the wording used in the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act 105 of 1983 (AJRA) where the Admiralty Court’s jurisdiction is stated as any 
claim brought with respect to;  
 
the employment of any master, officer or seaman of a ship in connection with or in relation to 
a ship, including the remuneration of any such person, and contributions in respect of any such 
person to any pension fund, provident fund, medical aid fund, benefit fund, similar fund, 
association or institution in relation to or for the benefit of any master, officer or seaman;204 
 
An early case to look at the seaman’s lien in South Africa is Continental Illinois National Bank 
and Trust Co of Chicago v Greek Seaman’s Pension Fund.205 In this case a fund constituted in 
terms of section 9 of the Act206 had a claim against it brought by the Greek Seaman’s Pension 
Fund (GSPF) providing that the claim suffices as a maritime claim as defined in the Act. The 
GSPF claimed on its own behalf and on behalf of other funds established under Greek law for 
the benefit of Greek seamen.207  
 
Contributions made to the GSPF were made up of an amount deducted from the seaman’s 
salary.208 The GSPF then claimed preference for its claims as it was for the benefit of the master 
                                                          
203 Gys Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction, Law and Practice in South Africa 2ed (2012) 263-264. 
204 Section 1(1) ‘maritime claim’ (s) of the Act. 
205 1989 (2) SA 515 (D). 
206 Section 9 of the Act addresses the sale of arrested property.  
207 Continental Illinois (see note 205; 521G-522A). 
208 Continental Illinois (see note 205; 521G-J). 
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and crew of the ship. The court held that it was a maritime claim in terms of section 1(1) (ii)(u) 
of the Act and the expression “wages and other sums due to or payable in respect of the master, 
officers and other members of the ship’s complement, in connection with their employment on 
the ship”.209 The contributions were found to be seaman’s wages.210 
 
An important case when considering the seaman’s lien in the South African context is Master 
and Crew of the MT Argun and Others v MT Argun.211 In this case there were three actions in 
rem instituted in terms of the Act against the defendant vessel by the master and crew of said 
vessel. The actions were based on the seaman’s maritime lien for wages. 
 
The seamen had ceded their claims for unpaid wages to a firm of attorneys for past and future 
legal costs incurred to act as their representatives. The defendant raised a special plea that by 
law, a maritime lien is not transferable by cession or assignment and therefore the firm has no 
action in rem against the defendant vessel.212  
 
The court found that it was clear that the master and the crew never intended to deprive 
themselves of their right to sue. The court also found that by matter of the law, indeed a 
maritime lien was not transferable by cession or assignment.213 The court held that the seamen 
never stripped themselves of their maritime liens and transferred them to the attorneys.214  
 
Another case of relevance when looking at the nature of the seaman’s lien is the case of Quick 
& Louw & Moore (Pty) Ltd and Another v SS Almoural and Others.215 In this case the court 
held that the person who at the request of the owner of the vessel paid the crew’s wages should 
                                                          
209 Continental Illinois (see note 205; 548). 
210 Ibid. Another case worth noting is MAK Mediterraree Sarl v The Fund Constituting the proceeds o the judicial 
sale of the MC Thunder (SD Arch, Interested Party) 1994 (3) SA 599 (C). The claim against a fund constituted in 
terms of section 9 of the Act. This was a claim for money’s lent and advanced to the owner for future payment of 
wages for the master and the crew. The money’s were held to be money advanced to obtain necessaries and 
therefore recognised as a maritime claim.  
211 2003 (24) ILJ 1104 (C). 
212 Ibid; 1114E-F. 
213 Ibid. 
214 MT Argun (see note 211; 1118A-B). On appeal (MT Argun v Master and Crew of the MT Argun and Others 
2004 1 (SA) 1 (SCA)) there were six issues raised, however, the appeal was dismissed on all grounds.  
215 1982 (3) SA 406 (C). See also Kandagasabapathy and Others v MV Melina 1981 (3) SA 950 (N) at 956B-F. 
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be recognised as a necessaries man and not a seaman and therefore cannot gain the protection 
of the seaman’s lien. The court found that seamen continued being a favourite of the law and a 
protected litigant.216 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
If the lien is as protected as it has been alleged, incapable of being transferred by cession or 
assignment, how is it then possible that an event such as piracy is a supervening event which 
will render the sacred contract that has been protected over many years unenforceable?  
 
Seamen are favoured vulnerable litigants and should continuously be protected against 
exploitation, which the courts have seemingly continued to do. However, there have been 
instances when the sanctity of the lien has been jeopardised by the law of contract. A principle 
to focus on in this paper is the doctrine of supervening event of impossibility applied in the 
case of Windrush Intercontinental SA v UACC Bershav Tankers AS.217 
 
The following chapter will discuss the decision of the High Court, KwaZulu Natal Local 
Division, Durban and the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal. I will highlight the issues 
raised in each court and how each court arrived at their decisions.  
 
                                                          
216 Ibid; 411. 
217 2017 (3) SA 1 (SCA). 
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Chapter 4 
4. The Windrush Decision 
Before the High Court of South Africa, Durban Local Division, KwaZulu Natal (hereon 
referred to as the court a quo) the first applicant, Windrush Intercontinental SA (Windrush) 
sought to set aside the deemed arrest of the Asphalt Venture instituted in rem by the respondent, 
UACC Bergshav Tankers AS (Bergshav); and the return of any monies paid in pursuit of the 
release of the Asphalt Venture (the vessel) by its Protection and Indemnity Club. This 
application came before the court a quo based on the following facts.218  
 
In May 2008 Windrush entered into a bareboat charterparty with the registered owner of the 
vessel, Bitumen Invest A/S (Bitumen), in terms of which Windrush took the vessel on charter 
from 7 May 2008 to 7 November 2015. Thereafter Windrush entered into a sub-bareboat 
charterparty with Concord Worldwide Inc I (Concord) for the same period. Concord 
(represented by its ship managers) entered into contracts of employment with 15 crew members 
from India for the Asphalt Venture. The contracts of employment were entered into between 
April and August 2010.219 The vessel was at that stage employed under a time charterparty to 
carry Bitumen, apparently principally between Durban and the Indian Ocean islands. 
 
On 28 September 2010 the vessel was hijacked by Somali pirates when it was about 100 
nautical miles east of Mombasa. The vessel and its crew became prisoners of the Somali pirates. 
Concord then engaged with its insurers, attorneys and instructing solicitors, consulting security 
advisers and, most importantly, appointing a negotiator to deal with the pirates. As a result of 
such, an agreement was reached which resulted in a ransom of some USD 3,4 million being 
paid to the pirates on 15 April 2011 in exchange for the promised release of the vessel and the 
15 crew members. The vessel was released with only eight of the crew members. The pirates 
went back on their word and retained seven of the crew members as hostages. They offered the 
release of the remaining seven against the release of some 120 Somali detainees held in India 
awaiting trial, presumably on charges of or relating to piracy. Unfortunately, from the 
                                                          
218 2015 (4) SA 381 (KZD). 
219 Court a quo, para 3. 
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perspective of the seven Indian hostages, their government does not negotiate with pirates. As 
a result, the seven crew members remained in captivity.220 
 
Each of the seven crew members had been employed by Concord in terms of a written 
agreement specifically for service on the Asphalt Venture. The contracts were concluded at 
different times between April 2010 and August 2010, and the fixed periods of employment 
varied between four months and nine months. The latest expiry date among the seven contracts 
was the end of February 2011. Accordingly, the specified period of employment of each of the 
seven hostages had terminated by the time the vessel was released in during April 2011. 
Notwithstanding this, Concord continued to pay the wages of all the crew up to 15 April 2011, 
when the ship and eight crew members were released.  
 
The eight crew members who were released were discharged from the vessel and Concord paid 
for their repatriation. Concord then continued to pay amounts equivalent to the wages of the 
seven detained crew members to their families up to and including October 2011. Concord 
claimed this was done on a voluntary basis and out of sympathy.  However, around October 
2011 Concord experienced financial difficulties and could no longer pay the crew and maintain 
their obligations in terms of the subbareboat charterparty with Windrush. This led to Windrush 
terminating the terms of the sub-bareboat charterparty on or about 17 June 2011. After 31 
October 2011 Concord no longer paid the amounts to the families which of course would have 
caused financial suffering for the families a great deal.221  
 
On 17 January 2012 a vessel belonging to the respondent- UACC Bergshav Tankers AS 
(Bergshav), the UACC Eagle, was arrested in Mumbai, India, by the relatives of the remaining 
seven crew members still in captivity, stating that they represented the crew members in that 
litigation. The arrest was sought to be justified upon the basis that under Indian law the UACC 
Eagle was a sister ship of the Asphalt Venture. It is common cause between the applicants and 
the respondent that in fact there is (and never was) any relationship between the two vessels. 
Nevertheless, the sum of the claims made by the families was USD 6,787 million, and the 
quantum was premised upon the proposition that the plaintiffs were entitled to seek in respect 
                                                          
220 Court a quo, para 4-7. 
221 Court a quo, para 8 – 9. 
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of each of the hostages a 'decree for daily wages' which each hostage would be entitled to be 
paid from November 2011 until each reached the age of 70 years.222  
 
The respondent claimed that due to the size of the claim against the UACC Eagle and the time-
consuming litigation which would ensue in the Indian courts, the respondent decided to reach 
a settlement with the relatives of the remaining seven crew members. This occurred during 
February 2012. The respondent undertook to pay the claims for crew wages for the period 1 
November 2011 to 29 February 2012, to pay USD 306 000 into an escrow account to cover 
future wages to the end of December 2012, and to undertake to pay and guarantee the payment 
of crew wages for the period 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013.223  
 
Against that the crew members who were held hostage, represented by their families, ceded 
their claims paid or guaranteed under the settlement agreement to the respondent, together with 
what they contended to be their associated maritime liens. Following the settlement agreement 
the respondent's vessel was released by order of the court in Mumbai.224  As cessionary of the 
relatives claims, in September 2012 Bergshav issued a summons in rem out of this court against 
the Asphalt Venture. The respondent sought payment of what it had already paid to the families 
of the seven hostages, and an order declaring the respondent's entitlement against the Asphalt 
Venture to payment of the amounts still to be paid in terms of the settlement agreement.  
 
The summons and the particulars of claim which followed asserted that the remaining seven 
crew members were entitled to be paid the wages reflected in their employment contracts 
during the currency of those contracts and, following any valid determination thereof, until 
such time as each of them might be repatriated. It was alleged that the crew had been employed 
by Bitumen as owner; alternatively by Concord as sub-bareboat charterer; or further 
alternatively by the first applicant as bareboat charterer. It was alleged in the main that the 
                                                          
222 Court a quo, para 10 – 11. 
223 This latter obligation to cover the wage claim during 2013 was subject to a right in favour of the respondent to 
call for arbitration on the issue of whether the seven crew members were entitled to wages pending repatriation 
for the period covered under the settlement agreement.   
224 Court a quo, para 11.  
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claim by the seven hostages was for unpaid wages, which gives rise to a maritime lien against 
the second applicant.225  
 
The seven crewmen remained in captivity when this case was first argued in August 2014. 
Further written argument was delivered thereafter, the last instalment of which arrived in 
December 2014. Fortunately, by then the parties were able to inform the court that the crewmen 
had been released. 
 
The hijacking of the Asphalt Venture on 28 September 2010 set in motion a series of problems 
for the sub-bareboat charterer, namely Concord Worldwide Inc (Concord). The ransom which 
only released the eight crew members cost Concord over USD 3 million. Concord also had to 
ensure payment obligations in terms of the charterparty were met. With all these obligations, 
Concord faced financial difficulties. These difficulties, and other subsequent events are what 
led Bergshav to resort to arresting the Asphalt Venture. 
 
4.1 The High Court of South Africa, KwaZulu Natal Local Division, Durban (court 
a quo) decision 
The case of Windrush Intercontinental SA and Another v UACC Bergshav AS Asphalt Venture 
(Court a quo)226 was a judgment which resulted from Bergshav (the respondent) issuing 
summons and particulars of claim for an action in rem arresting the Asphalt Venture. This 
action in rem provided that the respondent’s were entitled to claims acquired as cessionary of 
the claims by the seven crew members against the Asphalt Venture.  The respondent further 
contended that the seven detained crew members were and remained entitled to be paid their 
wages. However, the court was of the view that the pleadings lacked clarity concerning the 
precise basis upon which the obligation to pay wages stems from.  
                                                          
225 An alternative claim was made that the action in rem could be maintained because one of Bitumen, Concord 
or Windrush was both owner of the Asphalt Venture and liable in personam to the crew (and therefore to the 
respondent as cessionary of such claims) for payment of the claimed wages. Bergshav’s counsel conceded that a 
case had not been established with regards to the alternative claim therefore the only claim was whether a maritime 
lien exists, which the respondents, Bergshav were relying on. 
226 2015 (4) SA 381 (KZD). 
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On the other hand, Windrush Intercontinental SA and the Asphalt Venture (the applicants) 
contended that firstly, no claim for wages ever existed which were allegedly ceded by the seven 
crew members to the respondent. Secondly, the applicants claimed that there was no maritime 
lien which had arisen as the seven crew members employment had already ended, especially 
considering the ship having received no service from any of the seven crew members. Thirdly, 
if the maritime lien did exist, the cession of the liens was invalid. Lastly, if none of the previous 
challenges were upheld, a London arbitration and agreement conducted and concluded after 
the arrest divested the respondent of its claim and lien and therefore the deemed arrest should 
be set aside. 
The contracts of employment in contention were interpreted in terms of Indian law, which 
governed the contracts.227 The clauses of the contracts which were discussed were article 5 
(Duration of Employment)228, article 18 (Termination of employment)229; and article 19230. 
                                                          
227 This was an agreed premise. Ibid, para 18. 
228 Court a quo, para 20. Article 5 provides “An officer shall be engaged for the period specified in Appendix 1 to 
this Agreement and such period may be extended or reduced by the amount D shown in Appendix 1 for operational 
convenience. The employment shall be automatically terminated upon the terms of this Agreement at the first 
arrival of the ship in port after expiration of that period, unless the company operates a permanent employment 
system.”. 
229 Court a quo; para 21. Article 18 states “The maximum period of engagement referred to in Article 5 shall be  
G nine months, which may be extended to ten months or reduced to eight months for operational convenience. 
Thereafter, the Officer's engagement shall be automatically terminated in accordance with Article 18 of this 
Agreement.”. 
230 Court a quo; para 23. Article 19 states “19.1 Repatriation shall take place in such a manner that it takes into 
account the needs and reasonable requirements for comfort of the B Officer. 
19.2 During repatriation for normal reasons, the company shall be liable for the following costs: 
(a) payment of basic wages between the time of discharge and the arrival of the Officer at their 
place of original engagement or home; 
(b) the cost of maintaining the Officer ashore until repatriation takes effect; 
(c) reasonable personal travel and subsistence costs during the travel period; 
(d) transport of the Officer's personal effects up to the amount allowed free of charge by the 
relevant carrier. 
19.3 An Officer shall be entitled to repatriation at the Company's expense on termination of employment 
as per Article 18 except where such termination arises under Clause 18.2(b) and 18.3(a).”. 
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Another article of the contract discussed was “in the event of the seafarer being stranded, the 
company undertakes to repatriate him to his port of engagement”. 231 
The respondents relied on the opinion of two legal experts on Indian law, namely Mr 
Venkiteswaran and Mr Mukherji whilst the applicants rendered the opinion of former Chief 
Justice, Justice Khare.232 Mr Venkiteswaran, a senior advocate practicing in Mumbai, provided 
that in terms of Indian law the terms of the contracts of employment of the seven crew members 
in question continued to be in employment until their employment was terminated which could 
only be terminated simultaneously with their repatriation.233 The court a quo believed this 
opinion was incomplete. Mr Venkiteswaran, passed away before he could provide a second 
opinion explaining the first opinion he provided. The second opinion was then provided by Mr 
Mukherji who was an advocate practising in Mumbai.234 Mukherji supported Venkiteswaran’s 
opinion and relied on the decision reached by the Indian Supreme Court, Konavalov v 
Commander, Coast Guard Region and Others235. 
The opinion provided by the applicants was of Justice Khare who stated that the seven crew 
members were entitled to their wages until repatriation. However, based on the facts, the 
contracts would have been terminated as a result of the impossibility or frustration.236 The High 
Court was of the view that Justice Khare did not provide an explanation for his view. It is 
noteworthy at this point to state that the High Court made mention of Justice Khare’s opinion 
regarding the impossibility of performing the contract. Beyond the reliance on the case Horlock 
v Beal237, the court did not discuss the nature of the doctrine of impossibility or frustration and 
why the opinion was not a possible argument. 238 
                                                          
231 Court a quo; para 17. 
232 Court a quo; para 25 and 27.  
233 Court a quo; para 30.  
234 Court a quo; para 25,26 and 30. 
235 (2006) 4 SCC 620. The facts in this case will be discussed below.  
236 Court a quo; para 31. 
237 1916 AC 486. In this case the wife of a seaman approached the court for her husband’s wages for the duration 
of his employment. The husband had been detained in a German port because of the wat. The court held the wife’s 
claim failed as the capture and holding of the ship by the German amounted to a frustration of the contract which 
rendered the performance of the contract impossible.  
238 Court a quo; para 31. 
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The High Court dealt with the application in four parts under the following headings: 
a. Did a claim for wages arise? 
The respondent bore the onus of establishing whether a claim for wages existed. The court 
briefly discussed the case of Konavalov239 where a vessel, Kobe Queen 1, was arrested at 
Chennai by the Madra High Court at the instance of the owners of the cargo. Thereafter the 
crew lodged a claim for wages out of the anticipated proceeds of the sale of the vessel. The 
crew remained on board the vessel even after the vessel was seized and her cargo. The court 
noted that the Windrush case facts and the Konavalov facts are different. In Konavalov, the 
crew members were on board the vessel at all material times whilst in the Windrush case, the 
crew members were not. The first month which they are claiming for, and the claim accrues 
from is November 2011, seven months after the seven crew members were no longer on board 
the vessel. The court found that the Konavalov case did not support the respondent’s 
contentions. The court turned its focus towards what was discussed in The Ever Success240 
where the court endorsed the following quote 
“The lien of the seaman has regularly been supported by reference to considerations of public 
policy and jurisprudentially explained by reference to a seaman’s service to the ship. It was the 
service and not the contract of employment which procured the lien and pledged the security of 
the ship…Despite the judicial tendency on occasions to associate the wages lien loosely with 
the contract, it is not the case that the maritime lien arises out of the contract. The lien is 
established by reference solely to the maritime law and its existence is not wholly dependent 
upon an express or implied contractual term… 
The maritime lien is in respect of service to the ship. In the absence of some very unusual 
contractual provision, that service will ordinarily be measured by reference to the seaman’s 
contract of service (not it may be noted services) under which he was hired, whether by the 
shipowner, or (as in this case) the putative shipowner, provided of course that there is sufficient 
connection between the service and the ship in the sense discussed below. It follows that I 
accept Mr Lord’s submission that it is never appropriate for the court to evaluate the services 
of each seaman on a quantum meruit basis. The proper approach is to ask whether in the relevant 
period the claimant was rendering a service to the ship as a member of the crew. If he was, he 
                                                          
239 Ibid. 
240 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 824. 
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was entitled to a maritime lien in respect of his wages in respect of that period assessed in 
accordance with his contract.”241 
The court a quo believed that the decision of Konavalov was in line with what was said in The 
Ever Success as the matter relied on the wages, which were ordered to be paid in Konavalov, 
were taken from the contracts of employment. The respondent relied on the contention made 
in Konavalov that the confiscation of the vessel by customs authority put paid to any claim for 
wages or a lien and that Indian law would take a view favourable to the seven crew members. 
The court in Konavalov noted the “high pedestal” which the seamen’s rights to wages have 
been placed. Based on this, the court in Konavalov found that the confiscation of the vessel did 
not extinguish the maritime lien.  
Based on this, the court a quo believed the respondent had made out a prima facie case for the 
proposition that Indian law would recognise the wages claims of the seven crew members.242 
b. Is the claim (established prima facie) supported by a maritime lien? 
The parties agreed that in order to determine whether the benefit of a maritime lien existed the 
lex fori (the law of the forum) needed to be applied.243  As per section 6 of the Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Regulation Act 103 of 1983 (AJRA), the law of the United Kingdom as at 1 
November 1983 was applied in order to determine whether a maritime lien existed. 
The applicants stressed that the period which is being claimed for, the contracts of employment 
had terminated and that no service to the vessel had been performed by the seven crew members 
during the period claimed for.244 The applicants further emphasised that the maritime lien arises 
in respect to wages when the benefit to the vessel has been established. Without the service, 
the maritime lien cannot arise.  
The respondent relied on case law245 to state that the concept of wages is given an extended 
meaning to include shore leave, sick leave or repatriation expenses. These were said to be 
evidence that service to a vessel was no longer a requirement in order to establish a maritime 
                                                          
241 Court a quo, para 41. 
242 Court a quo; para 41 – 44.  
243 Court a quo; para 45. 
244 Court a quo; para 46. 
245 The Tacoma City [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 330 (CA); The Arosa Star [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 396, 402; The Westport 
(No 4) [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 559.  
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lien for wages. The court however was of the opinion that the facts of such cases were markedly 
different because in this case the period being claimed for had no service being rendered to the 
vessel. However, the court made mention that in this case, there were no services rendered at 
all after April 2011. The respondent argued that the claim may be described as a benefit due to 
the member of the crew can be labelled “as recompense for the execution of his duty”. If this 
were correct, the respondent argued that the contracts of employment governed and subject to 
Indian law, promised them wages from the date of termination of their contracts of employment 
to the date of repatriation. This promise was made without regard to the duration of the delay, 
without regard to what caused the delay in repatriation. The court was of the opinion that this 
promise was given for service actually rendered in terms of the employment contract and 
therefore enjoys the benefit of the maritime lien.246 The court was however of the opinion that 
the difficulty in this case may be that the terms of the contracts of employment and Indian 
statute would apply to facts which may never had been intended.247 
 The applicants accepted that the claim made by the seven crew members is a maritime claim 
as recognised under section 1(1) para (s) of AJRA which provides for the definition of a 
maritime claim to include “any claim arising out of or relating to the employment of any master, 
officer or seaman of a ship in connection with or in relation to a ship, including the 
remuneration of any such person, and contributions in respect of any such person to any 
pension fund, provident fund, medical aid fund, benefit fund, similar fund, association or 
institution in relation to or for the benefit of any master, officer or seaman..” 
The respondent stated that in order to decide whether the claim in question enjoyed the benefit 
of a maritime lien rested on the court considering the ambit of the lien. The court considered 
case law recognising a seaman’s claim for pension fund contributions as wages248 and further 
where a maritime claim is recognised as “wages” it is accompanied by a maritime lien.249 The 
court was of the view that the clam established prima facie in these proceedings was a claim 
                                                          
246 Court a quo; para 48. 
247 Ibid. 
248 The Halcyon Skies [1977] 1 QB 14 ([1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 461). 
249 The Tacoma City [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 330 (CA), Court a quo; para 50-51. 
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that passed the traditional test of recompense for  execution of duty and therefore the lien 
supports the claim.250 
 The court found that the privileged priority given to clams for wages was justified. Further, 
the court found that a maritime lien arose for the benefit of the seven crew members with 
respect to their wage claims. This was based on the court’s view that the issue is not the time 
when the debt arises but whether when it arises it has the qualities which place it within the 
scope of a maritime lien for wages.251 
c. Were the claims and maritime liens assigned to the respondent? 
Counsel for the applicant made a contention that the assignment, if legally possible with the 
sanction of the Indian court, was not actually not made. The order for the Indian court does not 
approve the assignment of the wages. However, in the Indian court, the applicants had 
advanced the opinion of Justice Khare who had provided that a maritime lien for wages, 
although not always assignable, could be assigned with the leave of the court. Further, Justice 
Khare provided the Bombay High Court had unquestionably granted liberty to the plaintiffs 
(relatives) to assigning their maritime lien. The first applicant thereafter did not take any issue 
with the assignment as they had been sanctioned by the Bombay High Court.252  The court a 
quo found that the applicants therefore could not argue that there was a lack of sanction from 
the court in India in order to refute the validity of the assignment of the wages.253  
The court considered the case of Mak Mediterranee SARL v the Fund Constituting the Proceeds 
of the Judicial Sale of the MC Thunder (SD Arch, Interested Party) 254 where the court provided 
that a person who voluntarily pays the claim of a seaman does not acquire the seaman’s lien 
and priority unless before making such payment, the volunteer received the leave of the court. 
Based on the fact that in this case, the court a quo was faced with circumstances where the 
                                                          
250 Court a quo; para 52. The court grappled with issues of jurisdiction which the cases The Halcyon Skies and 
The Tacoma City provided where the expansion of wages corresponded with the expansion of the maritime lien.  
251 Court a quo; para 55 – 57.  
252 Court a quo; para 58 – 60. 
253 Court a quo; para 61. 
254 1994 (3) SA 599 (C)  
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leave of the court had already been provided, the maritime lien had been validly ceded or 
assigned to the respondent. Therefore, the court must recognise the respondent’s title.255  
The court also discussed the issue of a lien for future wages. The applicant’s argued that there 
is no such lien because no line can be assigned that has not come into existence and therefore 
have not fallen due in any case. The applicants’ counsel provided that there was no evidence 
put forward to show the total claim being made in this respect and what claims had already 
accrued. The court agreed that the papers filed did not deal with the aspect of a lien for future 
wages. When the applicants tendered security, it was provided in full and it was not questioned 
that a lien could not exist for wages that had not yet accrued. The court a quo found that 
applicants should have addressed these issues in their plea to the action in rem and not in court 
a quo.256 
d. The London arbitration and agreement. 
The UACC Eagle, upon being arrested in Mumbai was under a bareboat charter to the United 
Arab Chemical Carriers Ltd (UACC). The award made by the arbitrator concerned both unpaid 
hire and indemnity claimed by the respondent against the UACC regarding the respondent’s 
disbursements to the families of the seven crew members made in terms of the Indian settlement 
agreement. The arbitrators award directed UACC to pay the respondent USD 705 100.81 by 
way of indemnity and declared UACC liable to indemnify the respondent regarding the 
remaining payments due under the Indian settlement. 257 
The court found that the London arbitration and agreement were to establish where the loss lies 
if the respondent is unsuccessful in its action against the applicants. Therefore, the respondent 
had a right to pursue the arrest of the Asphalt Venture for the debt assigned to them. 
                                                          
255 Court a quo; para 66-68. There are conflicting arguments in the maritime industry regarding the cession of 
maritime liens, especially those of seamen. In Canada the wages lien cannot be assigned whilst other debts are 
assignable by agreement. On the other hand, in the British courts there is a reluctancy to recognise the transfer, 
cession or assignment of a maritime lien. However, this cannot take place by assignment of a debt. The United 
States are more accepting of assigning liens. Please see William Tetley “Assignment and Transfer of Maritime 
Liens: Is there subrogation of the privilege.” (1984) 15 (3) Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 393 at 403 – 
408. 
256 Court a quo; para 69 – 72.  
257 Court a quo; para 80.  
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The court a quo held that the application to set aside the deemed arrest of Asphalt Venture be 
dismissed.  
4.2 The Supreme Court of Appeal decision258 
The Supreme Court of Appeal with Deputy Judge President Maya (as she was then known)259 
sitting was faced one crisp issue, namely whether a maritime lien existed for crew’s wages 
which would entitle the respondent, UACC Bergshav Tankers AS (Bergshav) to arrest the 
Asphalt Venture in terms of section 3(4) of AJRA.260 The appellants, Windrush Intercontinental 
SA (Windrush) and the Asphalt Venture argued that no maritime lien existed because the 
employment contracts were frustrated or supervening impossibility of any remaining 
performance of the contract. The appellants argued that the contracts of employment terminated 
on 15 April 2011 because beyond this date, they could not procure the release of the hostages 
or repatriate them under their employment contracts. Alternatively, if the lien existed, it was 
destroyed by Bergshav’s payment to the hostage’s families under the settlement agreement and 
the liens could not be assigned to Bergshav.261 
Bergshav, on the other hand argued that a lien existed and had been transferred to them in terms 
of section 11(8) of the Act.262 They argued that the lien existed because the employment 
contracts did not terminate after the release of the vessel. Alternatively, their employment 
contracts entitled the hostages to repatriation and payment of their wages until so repatriated.263  
In response to the issue, there were two inquiries made, namely firstly whether on a prima facie 
case Bergshav established the existence and nature of the claims sought to be enforced against 
the Asphalt Venture. Secondly, whether in terms of South African law Bergshav had prima 
                                                          
258 Windrush Intercontinental SA and Another v UACC Bergshav Tankers AS Asphalt Venture 2017 (3) SA 1 
(SCA) (“Windrush”). 
259 With Shongwe JA, Wallis JA and Dambuza JJA and Makgoka AJA concurring. 
260 Windrush; para 14.  
261 Windrush; para 15. 
262 Section 11(8) of AJRA provides “Any person who has, at any time, paid any claim or any part thereof which, 
if not paid, would have ranked under this section, shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and preferences to 
which the person paid would have been entitled if the claim had not been paid.”. 
263 Windrush; para 15. 
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facie established claims which by reason of their nature and character, are protected by a 
maritime lien.264  
The court provided that the maritime lien is not defined in AJRA, the term “maritime lien” is 
included under the definition of maritime claim under section 1 of AJRA. The court provided 
that a maritime lien is maritime lien by definition and its importance lies in that it constitutes 
one of the bases upon which a claimant may found an action in rem and secondly it bestows 
preference in the ranking of claims in terms of section 11 of AJRA. The lex fori decided 
whether a maritime lien exists and is enforceable.265  
The SCA considered the expert opinions advanced by Mr Venkiteswaran and Mr Mukherji 
relied on by the respondent. The SCA felt that none of their opinions were satisfactory. The 
opinion of Mr Venkiteswaran provided that in terms of Indian law, the contracts of employment 
of the seven crew members would be recognised as continuing until their employment was 
terminated. However, for this contention, Mr Venkiteswaran did not provide any reference.266 
In the SCA, Counsel for the respondent did not rely on the opinions and instead looked to the 
decision of the case of O Konavalov v Commander, Coast Guard Region267 and section 141(1) 
of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act268.  
Section 141(1) of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act states that “[W]here the service of any 
seaman engaged under this Act terminates before the date contemplated in the agreement by 
reason of the wreck, loss or abandonment of the ship or by reason of his being left on shore at 
any place outside India under certificate granted under this Act of his unfitness or inability to 
proceed on the voyage, the seaman shall be entitled to receive – (a) In the case of wreck, loss 
or abandonment of the ship – (i) Wages at the rate to which he was entitled at the date of 
termination of his service for the period from the date his service is so terminated until he is 
returned to and arrives at a proper return port.”269 
                                                          
264 Windrush; para 17.  
265 Windrush; para 18. 
266 Windrush; para 23. 
267 (2006) 4 SCC 620. 
268 44 of 1958. 
269Windrush; para 24. See also Directorate General of Shipping, Ministry of Shipping, Government of India 
available at http://dgshipping.gov.in/Content/MerchantShippingAct.aspx accessed 20.07.2018. 
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The Konavalov case was also considered by the SCA.270 Based on Konavalov, Mr 
Venkiteswaran and Mr Mukherji were of the opinion that Indian law would regard the Asphalt 
Venture as being “lost” and therefore entitle the seven crew members to their wages until 
repatriation.271 
The SCA also discussed the opinion of Justice Khare, whose opinion was relied on by the 
applicants. Justice Khare provided that the seven crew members were not entitled to wages. He 
opined that even if the contracts of employment of the seven crew members remained in force, 
any further obligation by Concord repatriate them after April 2011 was impossible due to a 
supervening event that to a reasonable person was not foreseeable. It could not have been 
contemplated in his opinion, that even after the full ransom was paid, the seven crew members 
would remain in captivity.272 
The SCA was of the opinion that the first error made by the court a quo was in the evaluation 
of the expert evidence and accepting the credibility of the opinion of Bergshav’s experts 
without analysing the evidence. The SCA provided that where a court is dealing with the 
evidence of experts on foreign law, it is entitled to consider it in the same way in which it 
considers the evidence of any other expert. The SCA went on to further state that foreign law 
is a question of fact and must be proved through reference to other experts of the country whose 
law needs to be ascertained.273 
The SCA stated that it was strange that the court a quo specifically stated that “Justice Khare 
may well be right” but decided to find the opinions provided by Bergshav as acceptable.274 The 
court provided that the doctrine of impossibility is applicable to contracts of employment where 
                                                          
270 The court in this case held that a seaman whose service is terminated by reason of wreck, loss or abandonment 
of ship (among other reasons) before the termination date envisaged in his or her contract of employment is 
entitled to payment of certain wages and compensation until his repatriation. The loss of a vessel did not result in 
a loss of a right to wages. Therefore, the crew were lawfully in the employment of the vessel against which they 
had a maritime lien for service. The court stressed the sanctity of the wages claim brought to the courts by the 
seamen and the importance of reasonably settling wage claims of semen as they are of lower means in society and 
a duty to act fairly exists. 
271 Windrush; para 27 – 28. 
272 Windrush; para 28 – 29. Justice Khare relied on the case of Horlock v Beal [1916] UKHL 795. 
273 Windrush; para 30 – 31. 
274 The SCA stated that experts’ evidence on foreign law needed to be evaluated as it would consider the evidence 
of any other expert. Therefore, looking to prove the factual evidence. Windrush; para 30-31. 
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supervening events render the performance of the contract impossible or majorly different to 
what was initially agreed to. It is a matter of fact of whether the contract of employment had 
been frustrated in certain circumstances. In support of this, the court looked at the case of Prest 
v Petrodel Resources275 which were ancillary divorce proceedings. The SCA chose to focus on 
the quote “'Courts exercising family jurisdiction do not occupy a desert island in which general 
legal concepts are suspended or mean something different”.276 Using the Prest case in support 
of their contention, the SCA stated that this principle was possible to implement even in 
contracts of employment.277 At this juncture it is important to mention that the SCA used the 
terms “impossibility” and “frustration” interchangeably.278 The court provided, 
“The doctrine of impossibility or frustration is applicable to contracts of employment where 
supervening events rendered the performance of the contract impossible or radically different 
from what had been undertaken when the contract was entered into. And whether a contract is 
frustrated in the particular circumstances of the case will be a matter of fact and degree. In 
English law a contract may be frustrated if supervening events prevent its further 
performance.”279 
 
A distinction between the two principles will be discussed in the following chapter as 
academics have recognised the two as different principles. 
The court provided that the piracy events constituted a supervening event which frustrated the 
performance of the contract of employment. The SCA went on to provide that the court  
“To continue to pay and support a crew not on board the vessel and not rendering service to the 
vessel, whose contracts of employment had terminated and who were held in captivity by 
intransigent pirates, who had been paid a ransom but demanded an exchange that was not within 
Concord’s power, could hardly have been contemplated by the employment contracts.”280 
Therefore, the further ransom and exchange demanded by the pirates became the unforeseeable 
event which frustrated the performance of the contract. As a result of the continued captivity 
                                                          
275 [2013] 2 AC 415. 
276 Windrush; para 37. 
277 Windrush; para 34.  
278 Windrush; para 33-34. 
279 Windrush; para 33. 
280 Windrush; para 35. 
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of the crew, the crew could not benefit the Asphalt Venture. The SCA quoted The Ever 
Success281 where the court provided that the maritime lien was in service to the vessel and 
service is usually measured in terms of their employment contract. Further, the service is 
measured by inquiring on whether during the period in question the claimant was rendering a 
service to the ship as a member of the crew.282 
Evidently the crew members were not on the Asphalt Venture and therefore in light of the 
reasoning provided, the conclusion reached by the SCA was that the seven crew members were 
not entitled to claim a wages lien as they had not rendered any services to the ship’s benefit 
during the period they were claiming for. The SCA disagreed with the court a quo and ordered 
that the deemed arrest of the Asphalt Venture be set aside, the security paid on behalf of 
Windrush be released and costs to be borne by the respondents.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
The words used by the SCA regarding piracy rendering the performance of the contracts of 
employment impossible were that piracy “could never have been contemplated by the 
employment contracts”.283 The SCA looked at the opinion of Justice Khare, in support thereof 
mentioning that the legal expert chose to rely on the case of Horlock v Beal.284 Horlock is a 
leading case as this case establishes that the occurrence of a war which leads to the 
imprisonment of a seaman, warranting the frustration of the contracts of employment, 
rendering the obligations in the contract impossible to fulfil.  
However, the SCA’s decision begs the question of whether piracy, in the Eastern region of 
Africa where the Asphalt Venture was hijacked, is indeed an event that could not have been 
contemplated. In discussing the decision reached by the SCA, defining what the doctrine of 
supervening impossibility is and whether piracy qualifies as such are vital. The next chapter 
will discuss the doctrine of supervening impossibility and frustration. Further, the chapter will 
define piracy and discuss whether the piracy event in Windrush suffices as a supervening event.  
                                                          
281 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 824. 
282 Ibid; 831. 
283 Windrush; para 28. 
284 1916 AC 486. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5. The doctrine of impossibility and piracy along the East African coast 
The general rule is that contracts concluded should be performed.285 When an event occurs 
subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, the promisor may be excused.286 The doctrine of 
impossibility acts as a good defense against an absolute agreement where the performance can 
no longer be effected due to a number of reasons; such as, where the existence of a particular 
thing, the existence of it being necessary for performance of the contract, is destroyed.287  
In the judgment of Windrush Intercontinental SA and Another v UACC Bergshav AS Asphalt 
Venture288, the applicants, Windrush, relied on the doctrine of impossibility in order to be 
excused from fulfilling the contractual obligations.289 The judgment relies on the doctrine of 
impossibility and frustration in order to hold that the applicants need not make payments to the 
seamen’s responsibilities.290 For purposes of this paper, it is important to provide a detailed 
definition of the doctrine of impossibility. 
5.1. Defining impossibility 
Robert Sharrock defines the doctrine of impossibility as occurring where if a contract has been 
entered into but later becomes physically or legally impossible for the debtor to render his 
performance, the debtor is excused from doing so.291 When the term impossibility is used, it 
does not refer to a situation where performance for a debtor has become too difficult or 
                                                          
285 Gilbert A. Cuneo and Eldon H. Crowell “Impossibility of Performance: Assumption of Risk or Act of 
Submission” available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3011&context=lcp 
accessed 11.11.2018. at 534. 
286 Ibid.  
287 William J. Conlen “Intervening Impossibility of Performance as Affecting Obligations of Contracts” 12 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 28 (1917) 31-32 
288 2017 (3) SA 1 (SCA). 
289 Windrush; para 28 – 29. 
290Windrush, para 33 - 35 
291 Robert Sharrock Business Transactions Law 9ed (2016) at 739. 
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expensive.292 This is not enough to excuse performance.293 Therefore additional difficulty or 
the performance becoming expensive will not constitute impossibility.294 
A good case to consider is MV Snow Crystal Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner 
of MV Snow Crystal295. In this case the Snow Crystal had arranged with the dock master in 
Cape Town harbour to dock at the dry dock from 1 December to 14 December 2002. When the 
Snow Crystal arrived, another vessel was occupying the dock. The vessel in the dry dock was 
undergoing repairs but moving her to another dock was not difficult. The contractor refused to 
move to another dock. In order not to upset the contractor, the dock master decided, although 
he had the power to, decided not to act against the contractor. Transnet claimed impossibility 
when the owners of the Snow Crystal claimed damages for breach of contract. However, they 
were not successful as it was not an impossible task but simply a matter of instructing an 
employee to act in accordance with the original contract. 
 
Christopher J. Bruce provides that according to the doctrine of impossibility, 
“…failure to fulfill contractual obligations may result in discharge of the contract, rather than 
breach, if the contract has become physically impossible to perform-for example, if the 
individual who was to have performed the contract has died-or if the cost of carrying out the 
contract has risen to such an extent that performance has become uneconomical-for example, 
if, after it had burned down, extraordinary steps were required to reconstruct a factory in time 
to fulfill a contract.”296 
 
Posner and Rosenfield provide that “impossibility” has previously been divided into 3 
subdivisions, namely “impossibility of performance”, “frustration of purpose” and “extreme 
impracticability”.297 They state that impossibility is the rubric used when fulfilling an 
                                                          
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
294 MV Snow Crystal Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner of MV Snow Crystal 2008 (4) SA 111 
(SCA). 
295 Ibid. 
296 Christopher J. Bruce “An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine” 11 The Journal of Legal Studies 
311 (1982). 
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obligation which is no longer physically or legally possible whilst “frustration of purpose” 
refers to a state of affairs where performance of the obligation is physically and legally 
impossible but the underlying purpose of the contract no longer exists.298 Frustration has been 
defined in the case of Tatem v Gamboa299 as occurring when something which is the “subject-
matter of the contract disappears, the contract disappears with that it was founded upon.”300 
Justice Goddard goes on to provide,  
“But it seems to me, with respect, that if the doctrine laid down by Lord Haldane, the absolute 
disappearance of the contract, or if it be, as Lord Finaly put it, “the continued existence of a 
certain state of facts” then whether circumstances are foreseen or not makes very little 
difference. If the foundation of the contract goes….it goes whether the parties have made a 
provision for it or not.”301 
Impracticability is the term used when performance of the obligation is physically possible and 
the underlying purpose of the contract is achievable but as a result of an unexpected event 
enforcement of the promise would entail a much higher cost than originally contemplated.302 
The term has also been said to refer to instances where performance will be extremely 
expensive, unreasonably time-consuming thus rendering it impracticable for the one who must 
render performance.303  
However, Posner and Rosenfield feel that these distinctions are unnecessary as it is a distinction 
without relevance to the purposes of contracts.304 In every contract case where one argues a 
discharge of obligations initially meant to be fulfilled, the issue to be decided is which party 
must bear the loss resulting from an event that has rendered performance by one party 
uneconomical.305 From their economics perspective, the discharge of obligations should only 
be allowed where the promisee is the superior risk bearer.306 If the superior risk bearer is the 
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promisor, it should be treated as a breach of contract.307 They provide that the term “superior 
risk bearer” refers to the party that is the more efficient bearer of the particular risk in question, 
in the particular circumstances of the transaction.308 
 
There are instances when the liability of the debtor will stand, despite the impossibility of 
performance occurring. These instances are when there is self-created impossibility309; where 
the debtor assumed the risk and where the debtor is late in performing.310 For the purposes of 
this paper, we will focus on the instance when the debtor has assumed the risk. 
 
a. Assumption of Risk 
 
If the debtor assumes the risk but continues to pursue the contract, he cannot be excused from 
the obligations of the contract based on impossibility.311 In order to determine whether the risk 
was assumed, the court has regard to whether the debtor foresaw the cause of the impossibility 
or ought to reasonably have foreseen it.312 As provided by Charles Brown, one of the conditions 
for impossibility is that the event which rendered performance impossible must have been 
unforeseen by the parties at the time of entering into the contract .313 Brown goes on to provide 
that in situations where the event was foreseeable and the defaulting party did not provide for 
its contingency in the contract, such party would be liable for damages, even if his performance 
may have not been commercially practicable.314 The relief in this situation is based on the 
notion that a state of facts remain unchanged.315  Brown felt that this interpretation of the 
doctrine of impossibility and its application thereof is accurate.316 This interpretation would be 
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the traditional legal rationale, which is different to what is the modern legal rationale. The 
modern legal rationale is based on the premise of balancing the community’s interest in having 
contracts fulfilled according to the terms, against pursuing performance which makes no 
commercial sense.317  
 
However, application of the foreseeability test has been met with criticism. One of the 
criticisms is that the test relies on the reasonable man test.318 Although the reasonable man test 
is helpful, it fails to protect the individual who does not foresee the foreseeable.319 The trouble 
in applying the foreseeability test in cases where the event was foreseeable, is assessing the 
nature and extent of the risk.320  Another position of criticism of the doctrine is that it suggests 
that a party has assumed the risk of the supervening event by failing to provide for it.321 
 
In the American case of Lloyd v Murphy322 the plaintiffs had leased property to the defendant 
where the defendant could conduct the business of displaying and selling new automobiles and 
no other purpose without the consent of the lessor. However, due to restrictions placed on the 
lessee regarding the selling of new automobiles, the defendant fell behind on his rent. The 
defendant then pleaded that the purpose for which the premises had been leased was frustrated, 
therefore his duties under the lease were discharged. The obligations in this case were not 
discharged as the court found difficulty in discharging duties under a leasehold and therefore 
the defendant could not rely on frustration. In this case, Justice Traynor provided a well-
rounded explanation of the assumption of risk and its consequences: - 
    
“The purpose of a contract is to place the risks of performance upon the promisor, and the 
relation of the parties, terms of the contract, and circumstances surrounding its formation must 
be examined to determine whether it can be fairly inferred that the risk of the event that has 
supervened to cause the alleged frustration was not reasonably foreseeable. If it was foreseeable 
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there should have been provision for it in the contract, and the absence of such a provision gives 
rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.”323  
 
Understandably, the assumption of risk has created issues in the past, such as in the South 
African case of Hersman v Shapiro324, one of South Africa’s early cases to look at the 
assumption of risk. In this case a dealer in corn (farmer 1) contracted with another dealer in 
corn (farmer 2) to sell and deliver to farmer 2 corn of quality and grade on a specific date and 
time. Farmer 1 however was unable to deliver same due to a failure of crops. The court provided 
that farmer 1 cannot rely on the doctrine of impossibility because the risk ought to have been 
assumed by farmer 1 and therefore not a supervening event. Hersman's case therefore implies 
that in order to be successful in pleading impossibility in South African courts, there needs to 
be absolute impossibility.325  
 
b. Frustration 
Frustration (commercial) was first recognised as an excuse for non-performance of a 
contractual duty by the courts of England.326 The doctrine of frustration has been limited to 
cases of extreme hardship so that parties to contracts make their arrangements in advance, can 
rely with certainty on their contracts.327 The principle, although Posner and Rosenfield provide 
that it should not be distinguished from the doctrine of impossibility, it has been the subject of 
debate.328 Andrew Hutchison provides that the term “supervening impossibility” and 
“frustration” are analogous.329 The scholarly difference between the two doctrines is that 
supervening impossibility is absolute whilst frustration is regarding changed circumstances 
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however common is that they must be beyond the control of the contracting parties and not 
attributable to any parties fault.330 
 
Authority for the doctrine of frustration is the famous English case of Krell v Henry.331 In this 
case a man (lessee) had rented a certain apartment overlooking a part of the city where the 
procession for King Edward VII would proceed through the streets of the London, celebrating 
his coronation. Both the lessee and the lessor were aware that the main reason the lessee wanted 
to hire the apartment was to observe the procession from the apartment. Unfortunately, the 
coronation did not take place as scheduled and the lessee refused to continue with the lease 
agreement and the lessor sued for the rental amount agreed to. The court held that the purpose 
of the lease no longer existed, and the purpose had been frustrated for entering into the lease 
agreement. 
 
In one instance, Hutchison provides that South African law does not possess the doctrine of 
frustration.332 Our courts, in order to avoid confusion introduced the doctrine of impossibility 
and the English concept of frustration; decided to refer to English authority directly. An 
example of this application can be seen in the case of MacDuff & Co Ltd v Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment Co Ltd.333 In this case the respondent had undertaken to takeover the 
running of the appellant’s company. The business of the appellant was the import and export 
of coal. There was a sudden decrease in value on the stock market for coal which meant that 
the respondent would suffer financial loss. 334 
 
The respondent pleaded that the venture had become commercially impracticable due to the 
changed circumstances. The court referred to English authority, Tamplin Steamship Co335 to 
support the contention.336 The court held however that in South African law this was a case of 
commercial impossibility and in this regard increased expenditure in performance does not 
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discharge the obligation.337 The English case used to support this contention was Tennants Ltd 
v CS Wilson & Co Ltd.338 
 
Hutchison provides that the doctrine of frustration is better to utilise because although it is a 
lacuna in our law, it is of assistance in times of war, hyper-inflation, change in political regime 
and any other unforeseen contingency which is blinding in the contract unjustly. The doctrine 
of impossibility is narrow.339  
 
The question that arises is whether the hijacking by the pirates of the Asphalt Venture in the 
Windrush Intercontinental SA and Another v UACC Bergshav AS Asphalt Venture340 was a 
supervening event of impossibility or whether it caused frustration. In the judgment, the two 
principles are used interchangeably by the court to describe the hijacking.341 The court goes on 
to discuss impossibility and frustration as follows;  
 
“The doctrine of impossibility or frustration is applicable to contracts of employment where 
supervening events rendered the performance of the contract impossible or radically different 
from what had been undertaken when the contract was entered into. And whether a contract is 
frustrated in the particular circumstances of the case will be a matter of fact and degree. In 
English law a contract may be frustrated if supervening events prevent its further 
performance.”342  
 
The writer submits that as seen in this judgment, the two principles of impossibility and 
frustration can be used interchangeably in South African case law. The writer submits that the 
principle of supervening impossibility and frustration should used interchangeably like Posner 
and Rosenfield provide343, as well as Hutchison344 suggest.  
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 The writer submits that the distinction between the two is not a major one nor is it necessary 
to disregard the one for the other. It will mainly depend on the jurisprudence the courts decide 
to follow between English or South African law.345 Therefore there is no need to make a 
distinction between the two principles, which is what has been rightfully done by the SCA. 
 
c. Conclusion 
The next question to be answered is whether the hijacking which occurred on 23 September 
2010 was a supervening event of impossibility which led to the contract becoming 
fundamentally different to what was initially envisaged when the contract was entered into.  
 
The question that needs to be answered is whether the hijacking by the Somali pirates was 
foreseeable and whether the owners of the vessel had assumed the risk. The next section will 
discuss what piracy is and whether in light of the above definition of supervening impossibility 
the hijacking of the Asphalt Venture suffice as a supervening event.  
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5.2. Defining Piracy 
Piracy is one of the oldest crimes in history and the only crime to have universal jurisdiction 
applicable to it.346 Defining it as any act of violence, Oppenheim provides the following 
definition: 
“Piracy, in its original and strict meaning, is every unauthorised act of violence committed by 
a private vessel on the open sea against another vessel with intent to plunder (animofurandi). 
The majority of writers confine piracy to such acts, which indeed are the normal cases of piracy. 
But there are cases possible which are not covered by this narrow definition, and yet they are 
treated in practice as though they were cases of piracy. Thus, if the members of the crew revolt 
and convert the ship, and the goods thereon, to their own use, they are considered to be pirates, 
although they have not committed an act of violence against another ship. Again, if 
unauthorised acts of violence, such as murder of persons on board the attacked vessel, or 
destruction of goods thereon, are committed on the open sea without intent to plunder, such 
acts are in practice considered to be piratical…. If a definition is desired which really covers all 
such acts as are in practice treated as piratical, piracy must be defined as every unauthorised 
act of violence against persons or goods committed on the open sea either by a private vessel 
against another vessel or by the mutinous crew or passengers against their own vessel.”347 
 
Piracy has been defined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as any of the following acts: 
“(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private 
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:  
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property 
on board such ship or aircraft;  
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State;  
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge 
of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
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(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or 
(b).”348 
Piracy has been recognised as an international crime and the pirate is an enemy of every State 
and can be brought to justice in any court.349 It is the crime against the safety of traffic on the 
open sea and therefore it cannot be committed anywhere else than on the open sea.350  
For purposes of this paper, it is important to consider whether along the African coast, 
particularly where the Asphalt Venture was attacked by the Somali pirates, was a random attack 
or whether these attacks were continuously occurring during the period in question. 
a. Frequency of Pirate attacks along the African coast 
Diana Chang describes the economic effect of piracy as a continuous international problem.351 
Majority of the reported attacks occur in Southeast Asia, off the Horn of Africa (East of Africa) 
and along the West coast of Africa.352 For purposes of this paper, focus will be directed towards 
piracy attacks occurring on the East coast of Africa as the Asphalt Venture was hijacked 100 
nautical miles from Mombasa, Kenya by Somalian pirates. 
The International Commercial Crimes Services issued a report detailing the number of attacks 
which occurred off the Gulf of Aden and along the East coast of Africa.353 The report provided 
that  
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“As with the figures of 2008, the lion’s share of hijackings have taken place off the coast of 
Somalia, either in the Gulf of Aden or off the country’s east coast in the Indian Ocean. Ninety-
seven of the 294 attacks have taken place in the Gulf of Aden, whilst a further 47 have taken 
place off the rest of the coast of Somalia. In addition, four attacks have taken place off the coast 
of Oman, although they can also be attributed to suspected Somali pirates. Somali pirates 
accounted for 32 hijackings with 532 crew taken hostage. Four crew were killed. Somali pirates 
are currently holding four ships and 82 crew off the east coast of Somalia.”354 
Maps detailing the dangerous waters have been distributed within the maritime industry and 
publicly.355 One of the maps show incidences occurring as far as 500 nautical miles off the East 
African coastline in 2008.356 Articles have been written detailing or illustrating the increasing 
number of piracy incidents by the Somali pirates along the East African coastline.357 Milena 
Sterio states that the world should view the Somalia pirates as terrorists based on the attacks 
that occurred over 2008.358 She goes on to provide that the occurrence of pirate attacks started 
as early as 2007 and had increased to 200%.359  
Annually the International Maritime Bureau prepare a report detailing the actual and attempted 
attacks by pirates in different regions.360 The 2009 report indicates 406 attempts and actual 
attacks having occurred. Of the 406, 116 were in the region of the Gulf of Aden and 80 were 
near Somalia.361 Shipowners are advised that a 24 hour visual and radar watch must be 
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maintained in order to have early sightings of approaching possible attacks, giving the master 
enough time to act accordingly.362 
The writer submits that travelling in the East African coast was a risk and the international 
community was aware of this. James Kraska and Brian Wilson provide that many ships started 
to detour around South Africa instead of travelling within the waters where the Somalian 
pirates often operated.363 This however was costly and time consuming.364 
Prima facie, the writer submits that the above reports and articles detailing the number of 
hijackings (attempted and successful) show that any member of the maritime industry ought to 
have been aware that the coastline near Somalia was dangerous water to travel in. When all the 
above is considered, is it possible to make a conclusion that the hijacking of the Asphalt Venture 
was random and could not have been foreseen by the parties?  
b. Piracy along the East African coast as a supervening event of impossibility 
As discussed above, when considering whether a party can rely on a supervening event to 
absolve themselves of their contractual duties, one should consider whether the defaulting party 
assumed the risk of the supervening event occurring and contracted with the other party 
nonetheless.365 In order to assume the risk, the party must have foreseen the possibility of the 
supervening event occurring.366 In this case, the supervening event is the hijacking of the 
Asphalt Venture.  
The Asphalt Venture was hijacked 100 nautical miles east of Mombasa. This area, as illustrated 
by the incidents reported on above, shows that during 2009 as many as 47 attacks occurred.367 
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The frequency of the attacks shows that it had become an international concern.368 The SCA 
provides that the obligations can be discharged if it is clear that “the supervening events 
rendered performance of the contract impossible or radically different from what had been 
undertaken when the contract was entered into”.369  
The SCA and the court a quo did not address whether the hijacking event could have been 
foreseen. Instead it dealt only with the doctrine of impossibility and the frustration of the 
contract that the piracy had caused.370 The writer therefore makes an inference that the risk was 
assumed by Concord, who had been the sub-bareboat charter at the time the Asphalt Venture 
fell into the hands of the Somali pirates. The hijacking occurred at a time when many reports 
had been issued.  
Despite the assumption of risk, should Concord be absolved of their obligations in terms of the 
contracts of employment. One cannot simply ignore the efforts of Concord, who had contracted 
with the crew members on a basis of employment contracts. Concord had continued to pay the 
crew in terms of their employment contracts as if the contracts had remained in force. This was 
after USD 3.4 million had been paid in anticipation of the release of all crew members, which 
only resulted in the release of eight crew members.371 Only after a further ransom were the 
remaining seven released.372  
 
The nature and extent of the assumed risk of piracy however could not have been foreseen. The 
writer submits that the assumed risk could only be extended to the hijacking and the initial 
ransom asked for. It could not have stretched to the further ransom paid. When Concord 
experienced financial difficulties and no longer had substantial assets or income, it became 
clear that their obligations could no longer be met after the ransom monies had been paid out.373 
Concord had simply continued to make the payments out of sympathy.374 
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The court, drawing on The Ever Success375 case, that a maritime lien for wages exists because of the 
benefit to the vessel, brings one to understand the conclusion reached by the SCA. In this case it was 
provided that  
“The maritime lien is in respect of service to the ship. In the absence of some very unusual 
contractual provision, that service will ordinarily be measured by reference to the seaman's 
contract of service ... under which he was hired, whether by the shipowner, or (as in this case) 
the putative shipowner, provided of course that there is a sufficient connection between the 
service and the ship in the sense discussed below. It follows that I accept [the] submission that 
it is never appropriate for the court to evaluate the services of each seaman on a quantum meruit 
basis. The proper approach is to ask whether in the relevant period the claimant was rendering 
a service to the ship as a member of the crew. If he was, he was entitled to a maritime lien in 
respect of his wages in respect of that period assessed in accordance with his contract.”376 
The crew members had not benefitted the vessel in anyway after the hijacking had occurred. 
Concord had tried to alleviate the crew members plight by making payments for ransom as 
soon possible but unfortunately were met with further difficulty where a further ransom would 
have to be paid. The writer submits that the purpose of the contracts of employment had clearly 
been frustrated as no service and benefit to the Asphalt Venture had been conducted by the 
crew members. The contracts of employment had been frustrated but also impossible to be 
fulfilled as Concord no longer had any viable assets or income.377 The writer therefore submits 
that it was both impossibility and frustration which occurred in the Windrush case.  
Further, as stated by the SCA, Concord could not have foreseen the further ransom and the 
exchange demanded.378 The supervening event of impossibility was therefore not the instance 
of the hijacking. Based on the information relating to piracy in the East African region, the 
writer submits that the hijacking was foreseeable. However, the nature and extent of the event 
was unforeseeable. The further ransom and exchange demanded were not foreseeable. 
Therefore, there was a supervening event of impossibility.  
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5.3. Conclusion 
The SCA’s findings although make one question the sanctity of the wages lien, it is important 
to consider the statement enunciated by the court. The SCA states in the Windrush case that  
“No more are courts dealing with contracts of employment entitled to disregard the basic 
principles of contract and treat employment law as excluding basic legal principles.”379   
This shows that the sanctity of the wage’s lien must not be protected to a point where 
unreasonableness is adhered to. The risk assumed by Concord was catered for when they paid 
out the first ransom. However, one cannot ignore the problem which arises when the nature 
and extent, as raised by Brown380 of the risk was not foreseeable. Concord could not have 
anticipated the actions of the pirates beyond paying the initial ransom.381  
The next chapter will address the findings that have been made in this paper surrounding the 
Windrush case and address the conclusion reached by the writer.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6. Conclusion 
Griffith Price describes the area of maritime liens under Admiralty jurisdiction as the most 
difficult and inconsistent branch of English law.382 English law recognises the bottomry, 
damage by collision, salvage seamen’s and master’s wages; and master’s disbursements as the 
list of maritime liens.383 As a result of section 6 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 
(“AJRA”)384, South African Admiralty law recognises the liens listed by Price as English 
maritime liens.385 
Price goes on to provide that the essential characteristics of the maritime lien are that firstly; it 
follows the property in question into the hands of third parties, irrespective of notice.386 
Secondly, it is a privileged a claim.387 The maritime liens are enforced by way of an action in 
rem.388 According to English law, the vessel is arrested as the action in rem is directed against 
the property itself.389 
One of the recognised liens is the seaman’s lien.390 The seaman in maritime law is continuously 
recognised as a favoured litigant because of the nature of his or her work.391 The seaman has a 
lien for his or her wages against the vessel.392 The wages earned by seamen are earned as a 
result of service to the vessel but are not limited to the shipping articles only and include 
overtime, extra wages and bonuses.393  
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385 Price (see note 382). Section 6 of AJRA provides that South African admiralty courts should apply law which 
the High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction applied immediately 
prior to the commencement of the AJRA, namely, 1 November 1983. 
386 Price (see note 1). 
387 Ibid. 
388 Price (see note 382; 410). 
389 Price (see note 382;411). 
390 Price (see note 382). 
391 Martin Norris Law of Seamen (1962) 366. 
392 “Seaman’s Wages” (1830) 3 American Jurist & Law Magazine 40. 
393 Norris (see note 391; 367). 
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The main characteristic for the wages lien to arise is service to the vessel. In the case of The 
Tacoma City394 Lord Justice Ralph Gibson at 335 the seaman were claiming severance 
payments which were not related to service in connection to the particular vessel. The court 
provided that “the wages must have been earned in respect of services rendered to the ship.”395 
Therefore as David Jackson provides; the lien is created by service to the ship and not the 
contract of employment. 
The question of whether there was any service to the Asphalt Venture is answered in the 
negative. After the crew members were taken hostage, there was no further service rendered to 
the vessel. Concord had merely continued to make payments to the crew members out of 
sympathy, however the well soon run dry when a further ransom was demanded.  
The question of whether the hijacking of the Asphalt Venture was a supervening event of 
impossibility remains an interesting point. The Somalian pirates have become infamous across 
the globe.396 Ships of different types and sizes have suffered at the hands of Somali pirates and 
the attacks were getting more and more sophisticated. 397 This led to the international 
community adopting resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to combat the crimes.398 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) did not discuss the doctrine of impossibility in great 
detail, especially in the context of seaman’s contracts of employment and piracy. 
Whether Concord foresaw the possibility of the hijacking occurring is an answer one can never 
be certain of. The SCA did not discuss the probabilities surrounding whether the pirate attack 
was foreseeable and whether there was an assumed risk taken on by Concord regarding the first 
ransom demanded. Concord might have foreseen the possibility of the hijacking (and catered 
for it as seen with the funds for the initial ransom were paid) but whether Concord was able to 
foresee the extent of frustration is unknown.  
The SCA also did not discuss the high risk of heading towards the East coast of Africa as 
discussed by Kraska and Wilson.399 Did Concord have the option of avoiding these waters? 
                                                          
394 [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 344. 
395 Ibid; 335. 
396 John Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 4ed (2011) 381. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid. 
399 James Kraska and Brian Wilson “Fighting Piracy” Armed Forces Journal February 2009 available at 
http://armedforcesjournal.com/fighting-piracy/ accessed 11.06.2018. 
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Did Concord assess the risk before travelling through the waters (100 nautical miles from 
Mombasa)? The uncertainty is unnerving as both the High Court, KwaZulu Natal Local 
Division (Durban) and the SCA did not deal with whether the risk was indeed assumed by 
Concord.  
The writer is of the view that the SCA should have discussed whether the hijacking would be 
covered as an assumed risk but not the act of the further ransom demanded for the release of 
approximately 120 Somali pirates.400 The writer agrees that the demand for a further ransom 
became a supervening event of impossibility.401 The region was one which piracy was 
occurring continuously but the fact that Concord was able to initially meet the demands of the 
pirates informs us that they had catered for the possibility of a piracy attack occurring and not 
the further ransom.402 To pay and continue to support a crew no longer benefitting the vessel, 
which service is required in order to establish whether a maritime lien exists, shows that the 
lien could no longer exist.403 
The sanctity of the seaman’s contracts of employment were also responded to where the SCA 
stated that there was nothing special about the contracts of employment in question that would 
exempt them from the ordinary principles of frustration of contracts.404 The SCA also stated 
that the case of Horlock v Beal 405was good authority as it focused on the aspect of service, as 
required by the case of The Ever Success.406 The SCA stated that  
 
“To continue to pay and support a crew not on board the vessel and not rendering service to the 
vessel, whose contracts of employment had terminated and who were held in captivity by 
intransigent pirates, who had been paid a ransom but demanded an exchange that was not within 
Concord's power, could hardly have been contemplated by the employment contracts.”407 
 
                                                          
400 Windrush; para 35. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Windrush; para 42. 
404 Windrush; para 34. 
405 [1916] UKHL 795. 
406 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 824. 
407 Windrush; para 35. 
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The writer is of the opinion that using the words “nothing special” to describe to the contracts 
of employment of the crew was although not a drastic comment to note, the writer is of the 
view that it is important that the courts be wary of dismissing the seaman’s claim for wages as 
nothing special when there are decades of case law providing otherwise.408  
The writer agrees with the findings of the SCA that Concord no longer had an obligation to pay 
and support the crew as a result of the supervening event. It is evident that Concord had 
stretched itself thin. The purpose of the contract of employment had been frustrated and 
therefore the employment contract could not be enforced. The SCA rightfully upheld the appeal 
by providing that due to impossibility Concord was discharged of its obligations in terms of 
the contracts of employments. 
  
                                                          
408 Please see The Sydney Cove (1815) 1 Dods 11; Harden v Gordon 11 Fed. Cas. 480, No. 6047; The Caracas 
Bay: Ex Parte the Crew of the MV Caracas Bay 1977 (4) SA 945 (C); and The Minerva (1985) 1 Hagg 347. 
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